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Abstract
This paper examines the incentives to exercise market power that generators would
face and the di®erent strategies that they would follow if all electricity supplies in Chile
were traded in an hourly-unregulated spot market. The industry is modeled as a Cournot
duopoly with a competitive fringe; particular care is given to the hydro scheduling
decision. Quantitative simulations of the strategic behavior of generators indicate that
the largest generator ("Endesa") would have the incentive and ability to exercise market
power unilaterally. It would do so by scheduling its hydro resources, which are shown to
be the real source of its market power, in order to take advantage of di®erences in price
elasticity: too little supply to high demand periods and too much to low demand periods.
The following market power mitigation measures are also analyzed: (a) requiring Endesa
to divest some of its generating capacity to create more competitors and (b) requiring
the dominant generators to enter into ¯xed price forward contracts for power covering
a large share of their generating capacity. Splitting the largest producer in two or more
smaller r¯ms turns the market equilibrium closer to the competitive equilibrium as
divested plants are more intensely used. Contracting practices proved to be an e®ective
tool to prevent large producers from exercising market power in the spot market. In
addition, a more e±cient hydro scheduling resulted. Conditions for the development of
a voluntary contract market are analyzed, as it is not practical to rely permanently on
vesting contracts imposed for the transition period.
JEL Codes: D43, L11, L13, L94
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1 Introduction
Chile reformed and restructured its power industry in the early 1980's. Competition among
generators was promoted and a 'simulated' spot market was created. Prices in this market
were not truly deregulated (except for the largest consumers who chose to enter into contracts
directly with generators) but were based in the short-run marginal costs of generators in the
system and the associated least cost dispatch. Two decades later, policymakers in Chile are
discussing the desirability of further de-regulating Chile's wholesale electricity market. In
particular, the simulated spot market that is in place today would be replaced by a real un-
regulated spot market in which generators would be free to bid whatever prices they choose
with competition between generators determining the bids and market clearing prices. One
major concern that has been raised regarding this spot market deregulation proposal is that
the high degree of concentration in the generation segment would enable incumbent gener-
ators to exercise market power, leading to prices far above competitive levels. International
experience on restructuring and reforms of the electricity industry on di®erent countries (UK,
US, New Zealand and so on) has taught us that this concern is legitimate. First of all, poli-
cymakers must realize that the electricity industry is prone to the exercise of market power,
as electricity cannot be stored, demand is very inelastic, producers interact very frequently,
capacity constraints may be binding when demand is high and thus even a small supplier may
be able to pro¯tably and unilaterally increase the market price by withholding supplies from
the market. The importance of an adequate number of generating companies that compete
in the wholesale market has also been emphasized. For instance, the experience in the UK,
has shed light on the market power problems that high concentration may create and dur-
ing the late 1990s, the government embarked on a program to reduce concentration through
divestiture and the encouragement of competitive entry. 1
This paper examines the incentives to exercise market power that generators would face
and the di®erent strategies that they would follow if all electricity supplies in Chile were traded
in an hourly-unregulated spot market. The analysis will focus on the impact of such a reform
in the biggest Chilean electric system, called the "SIC". Its installed capacity amounts to 6660
MW. Electricity is produced by 20 di®erent generating companies but two economic groups
(called Endesa and Gener) control 76% of total installed capacity and 71% of total generation.
These ¯rms di®er in size, composition of its production portfolio and associated marginal cost
functions. Endesa ("Firm 1") owns a mixed hydro/thermal portfolio, concentrates 78% of
the systems' hydro reservoir capacity and its thermal capacity covers a wide range of fuel and
e±ciency levels. Gener ("Firm 2") is basically a purely thermal producer and concentrates the
largest fraction of thermal resources in the SIC (46%). Analyzing Chile's sector is especially
interesting because a large fraction of its generating capacity is stored hydro. Previous
analyses have focused on systems that were either mostly thermal or entirely hydro (e.g.
Norway).
Following Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) and Bushnell (1998), Chile's electricity market
is modeled as a Cournot duopoly with a competitive fringe. Particular care is given to the
modeling of hydro resources, which are not only important because of its large share in total
installed capacity and in total generation (61% and 62% respectively in 2000), but because
of its impact on the incentives faced by producers when competing. As it will be analyzed in
1For more details on the lessons learned from the UK and US experience, see Joskow (2002).
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the paper, having hydro resources as a source of electric generation, means that ¯rms do not
take static production decisions at each moment in time, but that ¯rms have to take account
that more water used today, means less water is available for tomorrow: the model becomes
dynamic rather than static.
Quantitative simulation results suggest that if an unregulated spot market were imple-
mented in Chile, prices could rise far above competitive levels as suppliers, in particular
Endesa, the largest supplier, would exercise unilateral market power. The large thermal
portfolio owned by Gener, the second largest generator, is not enough for the exercise of mar-
ket power, as the relevant plants are mostly base load plants. Indeed, Endesa has so much
market power and can move prices up so much, that Gener's optimal strategy is to produce
at full capacity, pro¯ting from the high prices set by Endesa. Even though Endesa keeps most
of its thermal plants outside of the market, the real source of its market power is its large
hydro capacity. In particular, it schedules its hydro production in order to exploit di®erences
in price elasticity, allocating too little supply to high demand periods and too much to low
demand periods, relative to the competitive equilibrium. This hydro scheduling strategy may
be observed no matter what planning horizon is assumed in the model (a month, a year);
the only "requirement" is that there is enough "inter-period" di®erences in demand elastic-
ity. The smaller are the intertemporal di®erences in demand elasticities, the closer is the
hydro scheduling strategy to the traditional competitive supply-demand or value-maximizing
optimization analysis' conclusions (i.e. water is stored when it is relatively abundant and
released when it is relatively scarce). The importance of hydro resources for Endesa is such
that when hydro °ows are reduced (as occurs if the hydrological year is "dry"), Endesa loses
its market power. Under these circumstances, Gener has incentives to act strategically to
increase prices, but the resulting prices are still lower than when Endesa had all of its capacity
under normal hydrological conditions. Not surprisingly, alternative assumptions about the
elasticity of demand for electricity turned out to be very important, as the more elastic is
demand, the less market power can be exercised.
These results suggest that the exercise of market power should be of considerable con-
cern in Chile and that mitigation measures will be needed to prevent market power abuses
in the newly deregulated spot market. Di®erent market rules have been implemented as a
shield against market power abuses throughout the world. Regulators have relied on elements
such as splitting the generating companies into many small ¯rms in order to reduce the de-
gree of concentration of the generation sector (Australia, Argentina), vesting contracts in
order to reduce generating companies' incentives to charge high prices (England and Wales,
Australia) and continuing regulatory surveillance and threats (England and Wales, United
States), among others. Each country / electric power system is di®erent in terms of market
structure, size, mix of generating technology and even culture. As a consequence, the experi-
ence of another market, even if successful, should not blindly be put into practice elsewhere
without ¯rst carefully analyzing the individual characteristics of the speci¯c electric power
industry subject to reform. The e®ect of di®erent market power mitigation measures that
have been implemented in other restructured electricity markets are also thoroughly analyzed
in this paper for the case of Chile's electricity industry. In particular, I analyze and estimate
the impact of two di®erent sets of measures that could be implemented to reduce the incen-
tive and ability of the dominant ¯rms to exercise market power in a spot wholesale electricity
market in Chile: (a) requiring the largest ¯rm to divest some of its generating assets and (b)
requiring the largest ¯rms to enter into ¯xed price forward contracts covering a large share
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of their capacity. I compare the new market equilibrium to the competitive equilibrium and
to the base model equilibrium, in terms of aggregate levels, allocation of resources, markups
and overall welfare (when possible).
The divestiture of some of Firm 1's generating assets, either thermal or hydro storage
plants, turns the market equilibrium closer to the competitive equilibrium not only in terms
of levels (prices and output) but also in terms of the allocation of resources, as former Firm
1's plants are more intensely and e±ciently used and this more than compensates for any
reduction in production by the remaining producers with unilateral market power. The
application of ¯xed price forward contracts proved to be an e®ective tool to prevent large
producers from exercising market power in the spot market. In addition, a more e±cient
hydro scheduling resulted. It is argued that it is not practical to rely permanently on vesting
contracts to ensure the development of the contract market as these contracts will eventually
expire and if conditions are not given for an appropriate voluntary contracting, market power
abusive practices will certainly take place at that time. It is emphasized that the regulation
of the industry as a whole (as opposed to the contract market) must provide the incentives
for producers and consumers to contract.
This paper is organized as follows: the next chapter reviews the main ¯ndings of the
literature that are related to the topics covered in the paper. In Chapter 3 I brie°y describe
the Chilean power industry. In the fourth Chapter I analyze the model that will be the basic
tool for the analysis of market power in Chile's electricity industry. Data used to estimate the
model are reported in Chapter 5. Quantitative simulations of each generators' strategy and
the resulting market equilibrium are estimated under di®erent assumptions in Chapter 6. In
Chapter 7, a modi¯ed version of the basic model is used to estimate the impact of two sets
of mitigation measures. Both a qualitative and a quantitative analysis are done. Chapter 8
concludes.
2 Literature Review
This paper is related to three areas of research: the modeling of electricity markets in order
to (ex-ante) simulate strategic behavior after the industry has been deregulated, the analysis
of the strategic use of hydro resources to exercise market power and the impact of forward
contracting on the incentives producers face to exercise market power.
Three types of model have been used to simulate the strategic behavior of electricity ¯rms.
In the supply function equilibrium (SFE) approach, used by Green and Newbery (1992) and
Halseth (1998) based on the work by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), the producers bid a supply
function that relates quantity supplied to the market price. In the general case, the duopoly
supply lies between the competitive and Cournot equilibrium; the range of feasible equilibria
is reduced when uncertainty is added to the model.
Green and Newbery (1992) modeled the England and Wales electricity market using the
Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) framework developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989)
as applied to an empirical characterization of supply and demand, designed to match the
attributes of the electricity system in England and Wales (making alternative assumptions
about the elasticity of demand).2 They ¯rst present simulated values for prices, output
2Von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) and Halseth (1998) criticize on theoretical grounds the Green and
Newbery (1992) use of the SFE approach.
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and welfare for the duopoly case. They found that generators were able to drive prices far
above competitive levels, depending on the assumed elasticity of demand, while creating a
signi¯cant deadweight loss and producing supra-competitive pro¯ts for the generators.3 They
then examined the impact of restructuring the industry so that there were ¯ve equal-sized
¯rms. In this case, the equilibrium price was signi¯cantly lower and close to competitive
levels. In order to take account of the e®ect of potential entry, they examined the e®ects
of entry in the duopoly case under alternative assumptions about the price responses of the
incumbents to the entry of generators who acted as price takers. If the incumbents adopted
a strategy of not responding to entry by lowering prices, substantial entry was attracted by
the excess pro¯ts in the system. Eventually entry eroded the incumbents' pro¯ts completely,
yielding an equilibrium with ine±cient expenditures on new generating capacity and high
prices. The welfare losses in these cases were very large.
Halseth (1998) used the SFE approach to analyze the potential for market power in the
Nordic market. In his model, the supply function is restricted to be linear, with a constant
markup over marginal cost. This markup is independent of the particular technology used
by the producer but it varies between the di®erent time periods. Asymmetry in production
technologies is incorporated through the marginal cost function (each production level is as-
sociated to a speci¯c marginal technology (hydro, nuclear or thermal). Due to the importance
of hydro production in the Nordic market (it accounts for 50% of annual production), the
hydro scheduling issue is explicitly modeled. In particular, annual hydro production is re-
stricted to be less than the annual in°ow and the water in°ow that is stored between periods
has to be within the reservoir capacity. He found that the potential for market power was less
than expected due to the fringe's excess capacity. Only two of the six largest producers had
incentives to reduce production.4 Remaining producers did not have incentive to do so. In
particular, he found that hydro producers were not interested in reducing its market supply.
He argued that since all of its income came from hydro production (with a very low marginal
cost), the price increase had to be very large in order to induce it not to use its generating
capacity to the full.5 It should be noted that all the results of this model are reported in
annual terms. In particular, he found that hydro generating capacity was used to the full in
the year. However, nothing is said regarding how it is allocated throughout the year. This
is an important omission because it may be the case that hydro producers do not exercise
market power by using less than its hydro capacity but through a strategy that distinguishes
between periods of high demand from periods of low demand.
Auction theory has also been used to analyze strategic behavior in the electricity market.
Von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) model the UK electricity spot market as a ¯rst price, sealed-
bid, multiple unit private-value auction with a random number of units. In their model,
generators simultaneously bid supply schedules (re°ecting di®erent prices for each individual
plant), then demand is realized and the market price is given by the o®er price of the marginal
plant. They argue that producers face two opposing forces when bidding: by bidding a
high price, the producer gets higher revenue but a lower probability of being dispatched.
3Wolfram (1999) found that prices in the British market had been much lower than what Green and
Newbery (1992) predicted.
4These two producers are Vattenfall and IVO. The portfolio of the ¯rst one is split between hydro (42%),
nuclear (48%) and conventional thermal plants (10%). IVO is mostly a thermal producer.
5Johnsen et al (1999) concluded from this result that market power cannot be exercised in a market
dominated by hydroelectric producers, to what they add, unless transmission constraint binds.
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Equilibrium has di®erent properties depending on the demand level. In particular, when
demand is low, producers bid a price equal to the marginal cost of the least e±cient generator
and equilibrium is unique. When demand is high, there are multiple equilibria and the price
is equal to the highest admissible price.6 They remark that some of these equilibria may
result in ine±cient dispatching: the high cost generator will be dispatched with its total
capacity if it submitted the lowest bid, while the low cost generator will be dispatched for
only a fraction of it. Finally they argue that their model is supported by the bidding behavior
observed in the UK electricity industry from May 1990 to April 1991. In particular, they
report that while bids were close to generation cost at the beginning of the period, they
diverged thereafter, Even though contracts were in place in the ¯rst part of the analyzed
period, they argue that contracting practice is not a plausible explanation to the observed
bidding behavior because contracts started to expire after the change of pattern took place.
The coincidence of the ¯rst period with the low demand season (warm weather) and the
second with the high demand season (cold weather) makes their model a more appropriate
explanation. It should be noticed however that they analyzed a very short period. In order
to be really able to separate the contract e®ect from the high/low demand e®ect, and in this
way to get more conclusive support to their theory, the following seasons should be analyzed.7
Finally a third approach that has been used in the literature is to model the electricity
industry as a Cournot oligopoly where producers are assumed to bid ¯x quantities. An-
dersson and Bergman (1995) simulated market behavior of the Swedish electricity industry
after deregulation took place. They assumed a constant elasticity demand function (with an
elasticity of demand equal to 0.3 in the main case), constant marginal costs for hydro and
nuclear power plants and a non-linear marginal cost function for conventional thermal units.
They found that prices would increase and production would be constrained. In particular,
they found that the Cournot price equilibrium was 36% higher than the current (base) case
and 62% than the Bertrand equilibrium. Markups were not analyzed. They also analyzed
the impact of alternative market structures like splitting the largest company in 2 ¯rms of
the same size and a merge between the six smallest companies. In both cases equilibrium
price was reduced below the base case. Finally they analyzed the impact of increased price
responsiveness solving the model for a higher elasticity value (0.6). Since hydro production is
modeled on an average basis, nothing is said regarding how resources are allocated within the
year (for instance there is no di®erentiation between peak and o® peak periods). In addition,
nothing is said regarding how the portfolio of resources is used and how it compares to the
base and Bertrand equilibrium cases. This is an important omission given the importance of
hydro resources in the Swedish electricity market.
Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) and Bushnell (1998) modeled the California power in-
dustry as a Cournot triopoly with a competitive fringe.8 Cournot producers face a residual
demand where must run generation, the fringe's supply and hydro generation in the case of
Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) are subtracted from total demand. Marginal cost functions
were estimated using cost data at the plant level. A big di®erence between those articles is
given by the treatment of hydro resources: Bushnell (1998) assumes that Cournot producers
6Multiplicity of equilibria is given by the fact that both producers want to be the "low bidder" because
the received price is the same but the producer is ranked ¯rst, and thus output is greater.
7Wolfram (1998) analyzes the bidding behavior in the UK and tests the theoretical predictions of the multi
unit auction theory.
8Their market de¯nitions are slightly di®erent.
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use them strategically while Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) assume that they are allocated
competitively.9 In other words, in Bushnell (1998)'s model, hydro producers are "allowed"
to store water in°ows from one period and use them in another one in order to manipulate
prices. As a result, in his model the di®erent periods are not independent and thus the
maximization has to be solved simultaneously over the entire planning horizon, as opposed
to Borenstein and Bushnell (1999)'s model where each period can be treated independently.
Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) use a constant elasticity demand and estimate the model for
a range of demand elasticity values (-0.1, -0.4 and -1.0) and six di®erent demand levels. They
found that the potential for market power was greater when demand was high and the fringe's
capacity was exhausted, making it impossible for the small producers to increase production.
In lower demand hours, Cournot producers had less incentive to withhold production because
the fringe had excess capacity. In addition they found that the more elastic was demand, the
less was the incentive to exercise market power. Finally they analyzed the hydro scheduling
issue by allocating hydro production across periods so as to equalize marginal revenue. They
found that even though the resulting hydro allocation was very di®erent from the one implied
by the peak shaving approach, prices did not change much because as hydro production was
moved out from one period, the resulting price increase induces the other large producers and
the fringe to increase production. This result is di®erent from Bushnell (1998)'s ¯ndings.
Overall, the literature seems to agree on the following conclusions: more market power
can be exercised when the fringe's capacity is exhausted (which usually occurs when demand
is high) because this makes the residual demand curve faced by the ¯rms with market power
less elastic. The exercise of market power results in high prices, reduced output and in an
ine±cient allocation (production costs are not minimized). Results are very sensitive to the
elasticity of demand as well as the elasticity of fringe supply. In order to say something
regarding the role of hydro resources in the exercise of market power, a formal study of the
hydro scheduling issue is needed.
The analysis of the hydro scheduling issue is always done following a similar approach:
producers maximize their inter-temporal pro¯ts subject to certain constraints such as hydro
generation being within a range determined by min and max °ow constraints and by the
availability of water. Then, an assumption is made regarding what sort of strategy producers
may choose. Scott and Read (1996), Scott (1998) and Bushnell (1998) used a quantity
strategy and the industry was modeled as a Cournot oligopoly. The main di®erence between
their approaches is given by the method they chose to solve the optimization problem. While
Scott and Read used a dual dynamic programming methodology (DDP), Bushnell solved
the model by searching for the dual variables that satis¯ed the equilibrium conditions of
the model. In particular, Scott and Read used DDP to optimize reservoir management for
the New Zealand electricity market over a medium term planning horizon (1 year). They
estimate a "water value surface" (WVS) that relates the optimal storage level at each period
to the marginal value of water (MVW). The latter is interpreted as the marginal cost of
generating at the hydro stations. The schedule of the system is determined by running
each period a Cournot model in which the hydro plant is treated as a thermal plant using
the WVS to determine the marginal cost of water (i.e. MVW), given the period and the
storage level at that period.10 The Scott and Read approach is rich in details as hydro
9In particular, hydro production is allocated over the period using a peak shaving technique.
10The water value surface consists on a set of curves, one for each period, which relates the storage level at
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allocation for the whole planning horizon is derived as a function of the MVW. However
it is computationally intensive, especially when there is more than one producer who owns
hydro-storage plants. It is also data demanding as information on water in°ows is required on
a very frequent basis. Bushnell modeled the Western US electricity market, where the three
largest producers had hydro-storage plants. He adopted a dual method to solve the model,
treating the marginal value of water multiplier and the shadow prices on the °ow constraints
as the decision variables. He derived an analytic solution by searching for values of the dual
variables that satisfy the equilibrium conditions at every stage of the multi-period problem.
In order to solve his model, he simpli¯ed it by assuming that demand and the marginal cost
functions were linear.11 The planning horizon was assumed to be one month and the model
was estimated for March, June and September. Bushnell (1998) found that ¯rms could pro¯t
from shifting production from peak to o® peak hours, i.e. from hours when the fringe was
capacity constrained to when it was not. In particular, he estimated that hydro production
was reduced by 10% (relative to perfect competition) during the peak hours, resulting in
more than 100% price increase. Based on the estimated marginal water values for di®erent
months, he found that against what it was expected producers did not shift production from
months of high demand to months of low demand. He argued "since the market is relatively
competitive at least some of the time in each month, strategic ¯rms do not need to reallocate
across months in order to ¯nd hours in which extra output will have little impact on prices".12
The economic literature, both theoretical and empirical, also shows that the more of a
generator's capacity is contracted forward at ¯xed prices, the less market power is exercised
in the spot market and the closer the outcome to a perfectly competitive market, in terms
of prices and e±ciency of output decisions. These results are explained by the change in
producers' incentives that is observed as a consequence of contracting practices being intro-
duced. In particular, the more contracted a producer is, the more his pro¯ts are determined
by the contract price as opposed to the spot market price (see Allaz and Vila (1993), Green
(1993), Newbery (1995), Scott (1998) and Wolak (2000)). As a consequence, the ¯rm has less
incentive (or no incentive at all in the margin) to manipulate the spot price, as this would
have little e®ect on its revenues. Indeed, for su±ciently high contract levels (when the ¯rm is
"over-contracted" 13) pro¯ts are maximized at a price below its marginal cost.14 Producers'
incentive to raise the price is decreasing in the contracted quantity (Newbery 1995). Wolak
(2000) and Scott (1998) pointed out that what is really important for the ¯nal outcome is
the overall level of contracting as opposed to the individual level. In order for contracting
practices to mitigate market power, there must be some price responsiveness in demand.
In other words, the more inelastic is demand, the less important is the contracting level in
a certain period to the marginal value of water. It is derived recursively. The storage level at the beginning
of a certain period is calculated by adding to the end of period storage level a demand curve for release of
water (DCR), which is a function of MVW, and subtracting the (expected) water in°ows of the period. This
is done recursively starting from the end of the planning horizon, resulting on a water value surface. The
demand curve for release of water is calculated by running a one stage Cournot model for a representative
range of MWVs holding all other inputs constant. The DCR is given by plotting hydro generation versus
MWV.
11The slope of the demand function was assumed to be constant across periods and set at a level such that
the elasticity of demand at the peak forecasted quantity was -0.1.
12p.30
13A ¯rm is over-contracted when the contracted quantity is more than what the ¯rm can economically
produce.
14Wolak (2000) uses a very simple framework to illustrate these e®ects.
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producers' incentives to manipulate the price.
While the literature has extensively analyzed the impact that contracting practices have
on the "market equilibrium", the same has not happen with respect to their e®ect on hydro
scheduling decisions. Scott (1998) shows that the higher the level of total contracting, the
higher is total and hydro generation.15 He also found a positive relationship between the
total level of contracting and the marginal value of water. The e®ect of contracts on the
hydro scheduling issue is not explicitly analyzed in his paper. In particular, it is shown that
the higher the level of overall contracting, the higher is hydro generation, but it is impossible
to know how a particular ¯rm allocates water across periods.16 For instance, what does the
¯rm do when it is over contracted in one period and under-contracted in the other one?
Even though it is true that given a large forward contract position, the generator would
have less incentive to exercise market power, an important issue is whether the contract
market will develop or not. In particular the relevant question is why would the producers
voluntarily give up to their market power position and sign these contracts?. As Harvey and
Hogan (2000) claim "it is clear that generators will understand the incentives and will not be
likely to volunteer for forward contracts at low prices that reduce their total pro¯ts".17 An
important element in the development of this market will be the price at which the contracts
will be signed. Wolak (2000) uses a simple model of the spot market to show that producers
will be more willing to participate in the contract market the more elastic is demand for
electricity, as the lower spot price is more than compensated by increased sales. However, the
elasticity of demand for electricity is usually less than one. He also argues that risk averse
agents or regulation may also explain the development of a contract market. Wolak does
not explicitly model the contract market and nothing is said regarding how the contracted
quantity and prices are set. Allaz and Vila (1993) model the contract and the spot market
in a two period setting (contracts are signed in the ¯rst period and spot market transactions
take place in the second). They showed that producers are willing to sell contracts in an
attempt to improve their situations on the spot market. Under these circumstances the
contract market develops even in the absence of uncertainty. However, this result strongly
depends on the Cournot assumption, as Green (1999) showed. In addition, they showed that
if both producers sell contracts simultaneously, a prisoner's dilemma problem emerges. When
repeated interaction is added to the model, a reasonable assumption in the case of the power
industry, producers should learn after a while and will probably collude and not sell contracts
at all.
Green (1999) uses the supply function equilibrium (SFE) approach to model the spot
market (assuming linear supply functions) and di®erent conjectures (among them Bertrand
and Cournot) to model the contract market. In his model, producers know that by selling
contracts, the spot price is reduced while the equilibrium output is increased. They also
know that the equilibrium in the spot market could be the same if they had adopted a more
aggressive strategy in that market. Green argues that in order to be willing to participate in
the contract market they need an additional incentive. He points out two: a change in rival's
strategy or a hedging premium. In the particular case of his linear model with risk neutral
agents (contract price is equal to expected spot price) each producer's strategy is independent
15Over a certain level of contracting hydro generation is greater than in PC.
16It is impossible to know the answer to this question because of the way results are reported (hydro
generation against total contracting level).
17pp.9-10
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of his rivals' contract sales. As a consequence, generators with Cournot conjectures sell no
contracts in equilibrium, as this does not a®ect his rival's strategy. Under these circumstances,
the contract market would not develop. Green (1999) points out that Allaz and Vila (1993)
got a di®erent result because in their model the producers' strategy is given by the quantity
o®ered in the market and this quantity is a negative function of the rival's contract sales.
Finally, Green shows that when the buyers are risk averse and thus willing to buy contracts
for more than the expected spot price the contract market develops even if producers have
Cournot conjectures. The hedging premium is the additional reason the ¯rm needed to enter
the contract market.18
Powell (1993) also analyzed the impact of risk aversion in the development of the contract
market. In particular, he added risk aversion on the part of the buyers to the Allaz and Vila
(1993) model. He found that buyers were interested in purchasing hedging contracts, even at a
hedging premium, because they wanted to be risk protected but also because of the contracts'
"controlling monopoly power" e®ect. Indeed, Powell showed that the contract market would
develop even if the buyers were risk neutral and contracting were costly (contract price >
expected spot price); buyers realized that the more contracted generators were, the less
market power could be exercised in the spot market, and this was reason enough to contract
even at a premium rate. An important element of his model is the contract price and how it
is determined. He found that when generators do not cooperate in any market (contract /
spot market) the competitive outcome may emerge and full hedging results. However when
generators cooperate in one or both markets a price premium and only partial hedging results,
being the size of the contract market smaller when generators cooperate only in that market
as they use it to pre- commit to a certain output level. Partial hedging is reinforced by the
fact that the "controlling monopoly power" e®ect turns contracts into public goods and each
buyer wishes to free ride, reducing demand for contracts.
The contract market may also develop as a result of regulation. When the England
and Wales market was deregulated the government put in place a set of contracts between
the privatized companies and the RECs. Approximately 87% of National Power and 88%
of PowerGen's capacity was covered in the initial portfolio (Green 1994). Green (1999)
reported that generators remained heavily contracted after the ¯rst set of contracts expired.
In particular, greater sales of contracts used to back sales in the competitive market made up
for much (but not all) of the fall in the coal contracts.19 He argues that contract prices have
generally been above the pool prices and seem also to have been above the pool prices expected
at the time the contracts were signed. This suggests the existence of a hedging premium which
producers had been explicitly allowed to charge as part of an agreement to keep wholesale
prices below speci¯ed levels. Similarly, Wolak (2000) pointed out that generators in the NSW
and Victoria markets (Australia) were required to sell hedge contracts to retail suppliers of
electricity in a quantity enough to cover their captive consumers' demand. The prices of
these contracts were set by the state government at generous levels relative to prices in the
wholesale market. The vast majority of these vesting contracts have expired and it seems that
many retailers have voluntarily purchased contracts to hedge the spot price risk associate with
selling at a ¯xed price to end consumers. However, voluntary hedging has not been enough
18Green (1999) also argues that producers may use contract sales as a commitment device. In particular
they would sell contracts to commit to keep output high and spot price low in response to the threat of entry
or of regulatory intervention.
19See Supplemental Materials for Green (1999) in www.stern.nyu.edu/~jindec/supps/green/green.pdf
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to compensate for the expired vesting contracts.
3 Chile's Electricity Industry
Electricity supply in Chile is provided through four non-interconnected electric systems: In-
terconnected System of Norte Grande (SING) in the north, Central Interconnected System
(SIC) in the center and Aysen and Magallanes in the south of the country. Total installed ca-
pacity in 2000 amounted to 9713 MW. Due to di®erences in resource availability, each system
generates energy from di®erent sources. While the north relies almost completely in thermal
sources, the rest of the country also generates energy from hydroelectric sources and recently
from natural gas. The most important source of energy in Chile is hydrological resources.
They are concentrated in the central and southern part of the country, which explains why
the SIC relies heavily on hydro generation. Fuel resources are not abundant: natural gas and
a large fraction of the oil used are imported and Chilean coal is not of good quality. In what
follows, all the analysis and estimations will refer to the SIC, the biggest electric system.
The SIC is largest system in the country in terms of installed capacity and concentrates
more than 90% of the country's population. Gross generation in 2000 amounted to 29.577
GWh, 37% of which was hydro-reservoir generation, 38% thermal generation and 26% hydro-
Run-of-River (ROR) generation. Maximum demand in the year 2000 amounted to 4576 MW
(April). The generating sector is highly concentrated: 93% of total installed capacity and
90% of total generation are in hands of three economic groups (Endesa, Gener and Colbun)
being Endesa the largest of them (See Table 1). The Hirschmann-Her¯ndahl index is 3716.
In order to simplify the reading of the paper, I will refer to these companies as "Firm 1"
(Endesa), "Firm 2" (Gener), and "Firm 3"(Colbun). These three ¯rms di®er in terms of size,
their generating plants portfolio and the associated marginal cost functions (See Figure 1).
While Endesa relies mostly on hydro sources, Gener owns the majority of the thermal plants
of the system. Firm 3 has the lowest marginal cost plant, but is also the smallest ¯rm in
terms of capacity. Firms 1 and 2 both own low and high marginal cost plants, being this
feature more accentuated in the case of Firm 1.20
The electricity industry was reformed and restructures in the early 1980's. Competition
among generators was promoted, entry into the generation business was opened up to com-
petitors and generators were encouraged to enter into supply contracts with large industrial
customers and distribution companies. A spot market was created but generation prices
were not "deregulated" in the usual sense of the term, except for the very largest industrial
customers who chose to enter into contracts directly with generators.21 Rather, the system
de¯ned a "simulated" perfectly competitive set of spot and forward contract prices. Genera-
tors e®ectively were required to bid their available capacity and associated audited marginal
costs into the spot market. The marginal cost of the last generator required to balance sup-
ply and demand, taking into account transmission constraints and losses, then determined
a simulated spot market clearing price at each node on the system. That is, the "market"
20In addition, there is an important degree of vertical integration in the SIC. In particular, Enersis, the
owner of Endesa, is also the owner of two large distribution companies, Chilectra and Rio Maipo whose
customers amount to 43% of the SIC.
21Large consumers are thosewhose maximum demand > 2 MW. They amount to 50% of total consumption.
70% of them are really free to choose whom to contract with.
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clearing price, called the Short Run Marginal Cost (SRMC), is given by the marginal cost
of the last generator required to balance supply and demand, taking into account transmis-
sion constraints and losses. It is calculated by an independent entity, called the "Load and
Economic Dispatch Center" (CDEC), according to marginal cost information reported by
the generators themselves. Neither distribution companies nor large consumers have access
to the simulated spot market. Large consumers are entitled to enter into contracts directly
with generators and to freely negotiate the price for electricity. Distribution companies are
required to enter into long-term contracts with the generators, at a regulated price, in order
to purchase electricity for the supply of their regulated consumers. This regulated price is set
every 6 months by the regulatory agency called the National Energy Commission (CNE) and
is based on 4-year projections of the nodal prices as determined by the regulator. Forward
contract prices have been constrained indirectly by a requirement that they be no higher
than 110% and no lower than 90% of the prices charged to large industrial customers who
negotiate prices directly with generators. The transmission and distribution segments con-
tinued to be regulated based on traditional cost-of-service regulatory principles because of
their natural monopoly features. This economic policy was implemented in conjunction with
a huge privatization e®ort, where most of the electricity companies were re-organized and
then sold to the private sector.22 As it was already mentioned, it is currently being analyzed
the convenience of implementing a real unregulated spot market in which prices would be
set by generators' bid through a competitive process. For a detailed analysis of the Chilean
regulation, see Arellano (2001a, 2001b)
4 Theoretical Model
I will estimate an ex-ante model much in the spirit of Green and Newbery (1992), Borenstein
and Bushnell (1999) and Bushnell (1998) using real demand and cost data for the year 2000.
Following Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) and Bushnell (1998) the industry is modeled as a
Cournot duopoly (Firms 1 and 2) with a competitive fringe.23 The model that is analyzed
in this Chapter will be referred to as the "base model".
The portfolio of generation sources is very important; in fact, it de¯nes the way market
power can be exercised. The whole idea behind the exercise of market power is to reduce
output in order to increase market price. However, the decisions that producers can make
are di®erent depending on whether they are in a purely thermal / purely hydro or in a mixed
electric system. In a purely thermal system, the only decision that can be taken is when to
switch on or o® a plant and how much to produce at every moment in time; in this context,
market power is exercised by reducing output when rival generators are capacity constrained,
which usually corresponds to periods of high demand. A system with hydro-reservoirs, on
the other hand, allows producers to store water during some periods and release it in some
others; in other words, they are able to "store" power and release it to the market at their
convenience. Therefore, hydro producers are entitled to decide not only when to switch on
or o® their plants and how much to produce, but also to decide when they want to use their
22For more information on the privatization process, see Luders and Hachette (1991).
23I also estimated the model assuming that the third largest ¯rm (Colbun, "Firm 3") had market power
but it turned out that it always ended up behaving as a price taker. In other words, it wasn't big enough to
be able to use its resources strategically.
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hydro resources over a certain period of time. This (dynamic) scheduling decision is not
available to thermal producers.24 In a purely hydro system producers exercise market power
by exploiting di®erences in demand elasticities in di®erent hours. In particular, they shift
production from periods where demand elasticity is high to periods when it is low.25
Only water from hydro reservoirs (hydro storage) can be used strategically. Since wa-
ter from run of the river (ROR) sources can't be stored, it can't be used by producers to
manipulate the price. ROR plants will be treated in the model as "must-run" (MR) units
except for those ROR plants that are associated to a reservoir system upstream, in which
case it will be included as part of the reservoir complex. In the Chilean system, Firm 1 and
the Fringe own hydro-reservoir plants. Their hydro capacity amounts to 78% and 22% of
total hydro-reservoir capacity respectively. Firm 2 is a purely thermal plant, concentrating
the largest fraction of thermal resources in the SIC (46%). See Table 1 for more detailed
information. In order to simplify the model as much as possible, I will assume that Firm 1
and the Fringe only have one reservoir complex. They will be made up by the aggregate of
individual reservoirs.
The model will determine hydro scheduling by Firm 1. However, since the Fringe also
owns a medium size reservoir, it will be necessary to allocate its hydro production in a certain
manner. In particular, I will use the Peak Shaving approach. The basic idea is the following:
when there are no °ow constraints, producers schedule hydro generation so as to equalize the
marginal pro¯t that they earn from one more unit of production over the whole period in
which the hydro plant is being used. If the market were perfectly competitive, prices would
be equalized. If there were market power, then generators would equalize marginal revenues
over time. As long as demand level is a good indicator of the ¯rm's marginal revenue, a
peak shaving strategy would consist in allocating hydro production to the periods of higher
demand.26 In addition, producers also have to take account of minimum °ow constraints,
given by technical requirements and irrigation needs, and maximum °ow constraints, given by
capacity. As a result, hydro production by the fringe was distributed across periods allocating
as much as possible (given min/max °ow constraints) to every period in order to eliminate
or reduce demand peaks.27
Cournot producers face a residual demand given by:
DR(Pt) = D(Pt) ¡ Sf (Pt) ¡ qMRt ¡ qPSht
where D(Pt) is market demand, DR(Pt) is residual demand, Sf (Pt) is the Fringe's thermal
supply function , qMRt is must-run units' generation and qPSht is the Fringe's hydro production
from reservoirs distributed across periods according to a Peak shaving strategy.
Each ¯rm's maximization problem is given by:
24Notice that even in a perfectly competitive market producers are able to hydro schedule. The di®erence
is that when the market is competitive, di®erence between on peak and o®-peak hours is reducedas opposed
to when producers exercise market power in which case di®erence is enlarged.
25See Johnsen et al (1999), Bushnell (1998) and Halseth (1998).
26This is true when using either a linear or a constant price-elasticity demand.
27For more detail on the peak shaving approach see Borenstein and Bushnell (1999).
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Firm 1's Optimization problem
max
X
t
fPt(qt)(q1ht + q1T ht) ¡ CT1(q1Tht)g subject to (1)
q1ThMIN · q1T ht · q1T hMAXt 8t (thermal production min/max constraints) (2)
q1hMIN · q1ht · q1hM AXt8t (hydro production min/max constraints) (3)X
t
q1ht · q1htot (hydro resources availability) (4)
Firm 2's optimization problem
max
X
t
fPt(qt)(q2Tht) ¡ CT2(q2T ht)g subject to (5)
q2T hM IN · q2T ht · q2ThMAXt 8t (thermal production min/max constraints) (6)
where:
Pt(qt) = is the inverse function of the residual demand in period t
qt = is total production by ¯rms 1 and 2 in period t, (qt= q1t + q2t ),
qit= qiTht + qiht is total production by Firm i in period t,
qiTht = total energy produced by Firm i out of thermal plants, period t
q1ht= total energy produced by Firm 1 out of hydro-storage plants, period t
CTi(qiT ht)= Total Cost function, thermal plants, ¯rm i
qiThM IN(MAX)=Minimum (maximum) thermal production, Firm i, period t
q1hMIN(M AX) = Minimum (maximum) hydro production, Firm 1, period t
q1htot = available hydro production for the whole period
t =time period within the planning horizon. The planning horizon of the model will be
assumed to be a month and will be divided in 6 sub-periods (t=1,2,..6) of equal length.
Firm 1's Lagrangean is given by:
L =
X
t
fPt(qt) ¤ (q1ht + q1T ht) ¡ CT1(q1Tht) ¡ ¸1t(q1Tht ¡ q1ThMAX ) (7)
¡®1t(q1ThMIN ¡ q1Tht) ¡ °1t(q1ht ¡ q1hMAX ) ¡ ±1t(q1hMIN ¡ q1ht)g ¡ ¾1(
X
t
q1ht ¡ q1htot)
Firm 2's optimization problem is simpler because it only owns thermal plants. Its Lagrangean
is given by
L =
X
t
fPt(qt)(q2T ht) ¡ CT2(q2T ht) ¡ ¸2t(q2T ht ¡ q2T hMAX ) ¡ ®2t(q1T hMIN ¡ q2T ht)g (8)
Where ¸it; ®it; °1t ; ±1t and ¾1 are the Lagrange multipliers for maximum thermal capacity,
minimum thermal capacity, maximum hydro capacity, minimum hydro capacity and available
hydro °ows constraint respectively. They all must be positive. It is important to keep in
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mind that ¾1 is the only multiplier that is constant over time; it indicates the marginal value
of water, i.e. the additional pro¯t Firm 1 would get if an additional unit of water became
available.
FOC for Firms 1 and 2 are:28
@L
@q1T ht
= Pt(qt) + q1t
@Pt(qt)
@qt
¡ @CT1(q1T ht)
@qt
¡ ¸1t + ®1t = 0 (9)
@L
@q1ht
= Pt(qt) + q1t
@Pt(qt)
@qt
¡ °1t + ±1t ¡ ¾1 = 0 (10)
@L
@q2T ht
= Pt(qt) + q2t
@Pt(qt)
@qt
¡ @CT2(q2T ht)
@qt
¡ ¸2t + ®2t = 0 (11)
These conditions can be reformulated as follows:
MR1t = c1 + ¸1t ¡ ®1t (9')
MR1t = ¾1 + °1t ¡ ±1t = -1t (10')
MR2t = c2 + ¸2t ¡ ®2t (11')
where M Ri and ci are Firm i's marginal revenue and (thermal) marginal cost respectively.
Each ¯rm schedules its production in order to equalize marginal revenue to thermal
marginal cost each period (adjusted for shadow prices), as expected (constraints 9' and 11').
In addition, Firm 1 allocates water across time so as to equalize the marginal cost of water
(-1t) with the cost of producing an additional unit of power from the marginal thermal plant
(constraints 9' and 10').29 This means that an extra unit of water will be used to generate
power until its cost is equal to the cost of the most expensive thermal plant in use. The
intuition of this is the following: an additional unit of water would replace production from
the least e±cient thermal plant that is in use and pro¯ts would increase by the cost of produc-
tion that has been saved. If minimum and maximum hydro production constraints were not
binding, then marginal cost and marginal revenue would be constant as the marginal value
of water (¾ 1) is constant over time. Firm 1 would allocate hydro storage resources in order
to equalize marginal cost across periods. Firm 1 peak shaves marginal revenues rather than
prices. If thermal and/or hydro min/max capacity constraints are binding, these conclusions
still hold but applied to a broader de¯nition of marginal cost / marginal value of water that
includes the shadow price of increasing/decreasing installed capacity.
The Fringe solves exactly the same optimization problem solved by Firm 1; the only
di®erence is that @Pt(qt)=@qF t = 0 as it does not have any market power, and thus behaves
as a price taker. As a consequence, the fringe uses its plants (thermal and hydro) until the
marginal cost (thermal or hydro plants) is equal to the market price:
P = cF + ¸Ft ¡ ®Ft (12)
P = ¾F + °Ft ¡ ±Ft = -Ft (13)
28Slackness conditions are not reported.
29Notice that Firm 1 allocates its plants (thermal and hydro) e±ciently given the total level of production
(which is ine±cient as the ¯rm produces until marginal cost = marginal revenue < price).
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Some ¯nal remarks regarding the model that will be used to analyze the exercise of market
power are in order. First of all, and as the reader has probably noticed, this is a completely
deterministic model. In particular, hydrological resources, marginal costs and load levels are
assumed to be known in advance by the agents. Certainty with respect to thermal marginal
cost functions and demand °uctuations should not be a real concern, as the former are well
known in the electricity industry and the shape of the load curve has been relatively stable
in the past years. Certainty with respect to hydrological in°ows is clearly a more arbitrary
assumption. In the context of my model, this should not be too problematic either because
I assumed that producers maximize over a short time horizon (one month). The longer the
planning horizon, the more uncertain are the hydro in°ows, and the more important it is
to incorporate uncertainty into the model. Secondly, the model lacks dynamic competition
elements. This omission is clearly important for this particular industry. In the context of
a power exchange system, the producers interact on a very frequent basis providing optimal
conditions to engage in (tacit) collusive practices. For instance, producers can easily learn
their competitors' strategies, monitor their behavior and credibly threat in case of deviating
from the "collusive" strategy. In this sense, the results of the model should be seen as a lower
bound of market power. On the other hand, the model does not incorporate the e®ect of
high prices on potential entry or in consumption patterns; accordingly market power might
be overestimated. Finally, transmission constraints and contracts were not taken into account
yet.30
5 Model Parameters
5.1 Supply side
Each ¯rm's marginal cost function was calculated aggregating their thermal plants' marginal
cost functions. I assumed that each plant had a constant marginal cost up to its expected
capacity level.31 The constant marginal cost at the plant level (and at the plant "mouth")
was calculated as the monthly average of the weekly marginal cost reported by the CDEC.
This reported value does not incorporate transmission losses. Since market behavior will
be modeled as if all transactions took place at the same geographic node, it is necessary to
incorporate the fact that the MC of delivering energy at one node of the system is di®erent
from the MC of "producing" energy because a fraction of the energy that is generated in
the plant is lost while it is being transmitted to the consumption node. In other words, the
marginal cost of a KW produced by a plant located in node A and consumed at node B is
"production MCA" + "transmission charge". In order to incorporate this, I calculated for
each plant a "system-equivalent marginal cost" as Production MC x Penalty factor (calculated
by the CNE).
Each plant's capacity was adjusted for transmission losses, auto-consumption and av-
erage availability.32 Unfortunately it was not possible to get separate data for scheduled
and non-scheduled (non-expected) maintenance periods.33 Related papers do not adjust for
30The e®ect of contracts is Chapter 7.
31Start-up costs were not taken into account.
32As it was discussed in Borenstein et al (2000) the use of average availability may underestimate true
expected capacity.
33Availability ¯gures are high for international standards. This may be due to the way they are calculated:
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transmission losses that occur within the market but only for those that take place when
energy is imported. I think this assumption is not appropriate for the Chilean case. The
distance from North to South in the SIC is approximately 2300 kms. (about 1430 miles)
and so transmission losses are likely to be important. In order to take them into account
I adjusted capacity by the transmission loss factor. In other words, if maximum capacity
is q, then the maximum delivered capacity is q*(1-LF) where LF is the loss factor. Finally
since demand will be calculated as the sales of the system, auto-consumption must also be
subtracted from total production. I used the last 5 years average for both the transmission
loss and auto-consumption factors (4.6% and 2% respectively).
Resulting marginal cost functions are plotted in Figure 2. Notice that both Firms own
low and high marginal cost plants, being this feature more accentuated in the case of Firm
1.
5.2 Demand
As it was said before, Cournot producers face a residual demand given by:
DR(Pt) = D(Pt) ¡ Sf (Pt) ¡ qMRt ¡ qPSht
Where D(Pt) is market demand, DR(Pt) is residual market demand, Sf (Pt) is the fringe
supply's function (adjusted by transmission losses), qM Rt is must-run units' generation and
qP Sht is the hydro production from reservoirs owned by the fringe that is distributed across
periods according to a Peak shaving strategy.
5.2.1 Market demand :
I constructed a step function representation of April-2000's load curve with 6 discrete load
levels (t=1 for the highest load level).34 The load level of each step was set equal to the
average of the loads covered by those hours in the full load pro¯le (see Figure 3).35 Each load
level has an associated price given by the regulated price, which is the price paid by ¯nal
consumers. This price-quantity point will be referred to as the "anchor point" for each period
(Figure 4). Given that there is only one price-quantity observation for each period, it is not
possible to directly estimate the market demand function; all that can be done is to assume
a functional form and parameterize it using each period's anchor point and an assumption
for the price-elasticity of demand for electricity.
Demand is assumed to be linear D(Pt) = At ¡ BPt .36 As a consequence, price elasticity
increases as the level of production is reduced and the elasticity of demand at the price where
the market clears is always higher when there is market power.
The empirical literature has emphasized the importance of price elasticity of demand in
the results. In my model, demand elasticity will also turn out to be very important, as
a plant is considered to be available if it doesn't go down when it is dispatched. However plants that are not
dispatched but are available are also considered being available. The issue here is that there is no certainty
that those apparently available, non-dispatched plants would be e®ectively available if dispatched. In addition,
availability data seems to include maintenance periods, which is a strategic variable.
34I chose April because historically it has been the month where the maximum demand of the year takes
place.
35The observed load per hour was increased by 13% to take account of spinning reserves.
36A linear functional form is consistent with the peak shaving criteria that will be used later to allocate
hydro generation: periods of high demand are also periods of high marginal revenue.
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Cournot equilibrium will be closer to the competitive equilibrium the more elastic is demand.
In addition hydro scheduling will be determined in part by demand elasticity. Estimates of
the price elasticity of demand for electricity vary widely in the literature. As Dahl (1993)
pointed out, the estimation of price elasticity is sensitive to the type of model used, to the
estimation technique and to the data set used. In addition, studies di®er on their de¯nition
of short run and long run price elasticity.37 In lagged adjustment models short run is de¯ned
as the 1-year response to a permanent increase in prices. Garcia-Cerruti (2000) using panel
aggregate data for selected California counties (1983-1997) estimated that short run price
elasticity went from -0.132 to -0.172, while the range for the long run was from -0.17 to -0.19.
In the particular case of Chile, Galetovic et al (2001) used a partial adjustment model to
estimate the demand for electricity by commercial and residential users. Their estimates of
short run (long run) price elasticity were -0.33 (-0.41) and -0.19 (-0.21) for residential and
commercial users respectively.38 Short run estimates of price elasticity are lower when the
period in which the consumption pattern may be adjusted is shorter. Wolak and Patrick
(2001) looked for changes in electricity consumption due to half hourly price changes in
the England and Wales market. They focused on 5 large and medium sized industrial and
commercial customers. Not surprisingly, they got much lower estimates of price elasticity.
In the water supply industry, which was the most price responsive industry analyzed, price
elasticity estimates went from nearly zero (at peak) to -0.27. The steel tube industry was
the least price responsive industry, with price elasticity estimates going from nearly zero to
-0.007 (there is no indication of the demand level at which the upper estimate was observed).
Finally, Dahl (1992) found no clear evidence that the developing world's energy demand were
less price elastic than for the industrial world.
Because of the large variation in the price-elasticity estimates, I follow the traditional
approach of estimating and reporting the results of the model for di®erent values of elasticity.
In particular, the market demand will be estimated for 5 di®erent assumptions of price
elasticity of demand E = f-0.1, -1/3, -1/2, -2/3, -1.0g, measured at the anchor point at peak
hours. In the main body of the paper I only report results for -1/3 and -2/3.39 These values
may appear to be high compared to some of the estimates reported. However under the
assumption that consumers are sensitive to price changes at least until a certain degree, it is
not reasonable to assume that consumers will not react to the exercise of market power. In
particular, we should expect them to learn, after a while, that the price is higher in certain
periods than in others and to adjust their consumption behavior accordingly.40 This change
should mitigate the potential for market power. It is very di±cult to explicitly incorporate
37Nesbakken (1999) suggested that since there is a lot of individual variation in energy used, estimates
based on micro data were more reliable.
38As I mentioned before, the regulated price in Chile is ¯xed for a period of 6 months. During that period,
it changes mostly according to he evolution of in°ation. This means that the authors did not have much price
variation over time. However, since the price that was used to estimate price elasticity was the ¯nal price,
and since that price includes transmission and distribution charges that vary across consumers according to
di®erent parameters, they did have cross-section price variation.
39For comparison purposes, I report price elasticity values ("E") assumed by other authors. A constant
elasticity of demand was assumed by Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), estimating the model for E=-0.1, -0.4
and -1.0 and by Andersson and Bergman (1995) who used E=-0.3. A linear demand was assumed by Wolfram
(1999) with E=-0.17 at the mean price and quantity and by Bushnell (1998) who assumed E=-0.1 at peak
forecasted price/quantity point.
40See Wolak and Patrick (2001) and Herriges et al (1993) for estimations of elasticity of substitution within
the day.
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this demand side reaction to market power into the model. An indirect way of doing it is to
assume that the market is more price responsive than short run estimates of price elasticity
indicate. Results for the E=-2/3 assumption are reported as a way to illustrate the e®ect
of increasing price-sensitivity of demand. The results for the case of E = -0.1, E=-1/2 and
E=-1.0 are reported in the Appendix 1.
The price elasticity assumption was incorporated in the model through the slope param-
eter B, which was calculated such that the elasticity at the peak demand level was equal
to "E". This implies that I will work with parallel demands ("same slope"). The intercept
was calculated so as to ¯t anchor quantity and anchor price at each demand level (given the
calculated slope B).41 See Table 2 for demand parameters used assuming E = -1/3.
By assuming that market demand is linear and the slope is constant across load levels,
I am implicitly assuming that market demand at peak hours is less elastic than demand
at o® peak hours (at a constant price).42 Neither the linear demand assumption nor the
anchor point chosen had any in°uence on the results. The main conclusions (even order of
magnitudes) were the same when running the simulation assuming that the slope was not
constant.43
5.2.2 Fringe's supply :
In order to minimize the number of steps that the residual demand faced by Cournot pro-
ducers have, I decided to use a linear approximation of the Fringe's supply function. This
linear function is given by the following expression (see Figure 5):
M CF =
8>><>>:
3:66 for 0 · QF · 54:9 MW
¡114:60441 + 2:156038QF for 54:9 · QF · 58:5 MW
11:51217 for 58:5 · QF · 399:9 M W
¡333:526 + 0:8628848QF for 399:9 · QF · 433:7 M W
9>>=>>; (14)
5.2.3 Must run quantity:
The plants that have to be dispatched all the time (no matter the price) and thus cannot be
used strategically by their owners were designated as "must run" plants. They include two
small co-generator thermal plants that produce electricity and steam and all the hydro-ROR
plants that are not associated to any reservoir system. qM Rwas calculated as April 2000's
average generation per hour in the case of thermal plants, and in the case of hydro-ROR
41A similar approach was used by Bushnell (1998).
42Empirical evidence supports the assumption of price elasticity being a function of the output level as the
linear functional form implies. However, evidence is not conclusive regarding whether demand at peak hours
is more or less elastic than at o® peak hours. Aigner et al (1994) estimated that demand for electricity in the
winter was more elastic during peak periods while in the spring/autumn season it was the o® peak demand
the one that was more price responsive.
43In the "di®erent slope approach", the slope parameter B was such that the elasticity at every anchor
point was equal to "E". Results are reported in Appendix #1. I decided to report in the paper the results
for the same slope approach because when using the di®erent slope approach, residual demands intersect on
a certain (and relevant) price range making it more di±cult to interpret results. Results are almost the same
under both approaches.
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plants, as the average generation in a normal hydro year calculated according to the Energy
Matrix provided by the CDEC.44
5.2.4 Hydro-reservoir generation by the Fringe ( qPSh).
In order to allocate the hydro-storage generation by the Fringe, I calculated, for each plant,
the average generation per month (in this case April) in a normal hydrological year based on
the Energy Matrix estimated by the CDEC. This monthly hydro generation was assumed to
be total hydro production available for the period. It was allocated over the month according
to the peak shaving strategy described before. Minimum and maximum °ow constraints were
also taken into account. qPSh used to estimate the model is the average hydro generation
per hour allocated to each sub-period according to this approach. Since the Fringe owns
relatively small hydro-storage plants, the amount of hydro production that can be allocated
through a peak shaving approach is also small. Peaks are only slightly reduced and the shape
of the "shaved load" curve remains mostly the same. (See Figure 6).
5.2.5 Residual demand :
Table 3 summarizes what was subtracted from market demand (April 2000) to get the residual
demand faced by the Cournot producers. The shape and position of residual demands faced
by Cournot producers is explained by a combination of three elements: the anchor point, the
fringe's supply for thermal production and the load curve shape that results after allocating
fringe's hydro production through a peak shaving strategy (Figure 7).
5.3 Hydro data
Minimum hydro production per hour is given by technical requirements and by irrigation
contracts. Maximum hydro production per hour is determined by technical requirements.
Total April's available hydro production is 1118.1 GWh according to the Energy Matrix
provided by the CDEC (See Table 4).45 Fringe's hydro production was allocated according
to the Peak shaving strategy, as was explained before. Hydro scheduling by Firm 1 will be a
result of the model.
6 Simulation Results
6.1 Competitive equilibrium
As a benchmark case, I calculated the competitive equilibrium. System's hydro-storage pro-
duction (by the Fringe and Firm 1) was allocated according to the peak shaving strategy.
The competitive equilibrium was calculated as the quantity - price point where demand (net
of hydro production) and the aggregate marginal cost function intersect. The estimated
Competitive Equilibrium for E=-1/3 and E=-2/3 are reported in Tables 5 and 6.
44Since must run plants' production was subtracted from total demand, must run plants were also removed
from the set of available units (in other words, they are not included in the aggregated marginal cost function).
45Unfortunately, the CDEC does not have and estimation for the Laja system (the largest in the country).
Because of that I used the observed average generation of that hydro system in April of a normal year.
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Observe that the equilibrium is exactly the same for the ¯rst four periods (t=1 to 4) and
almost the same for the ¯fth one. This is a consequence of net demand being the same in
those periods, or, in other words, of hydro production being so large that its allocation across
the month completely °attens demand in those periods, eliminating (reducing) the peaks.
See Figure 8.
6.2 Cournot equilibrium
The Cournot-Fringe model was solved with GAMS/CONOPT using an iterative process. I
started assuming that each ¯rm produced at the average level observed in April 2000, and
then solved for the Cournot equilibrium for Firm 2. Given the resulting production schedule,
I solved for Firm 1 and used the resulting Cournot equilibrium as an input for Firm 2's
maximization problem. I continued this iteration process until the model converged to a
solution for each of the ¯rms.46 Results are reported in Tables 7 and 8.
Total quantity is smaller than in the competitive model and prices are considerably higher,
especially when demand is high (see Figures 9 and 10). Notice that as demand falls, the
Cournot equilibrium (price and production) converges monotonically to the competitive equi-
librium. The exception is given by the last period when demand is at its lowest level which
may be explained by Firm 2 increasingly constraining production as demand falls. The more
elastic is demand, the larger is total production and the closer is hydro scheduling to the
competitive equilibrium
When demand is at high and medium levels Firm 1 is the one that really enjoys market
power. Indeed, Firm 1 has so much market power and is able to drive prices up by so much
that Firm 2's optimal strategy is to produce at capacity. Firm 2 exercises market power only
in the last 2 periods, when demand is low (see Figure 12).47
Firm 1 chooses to satisfy demand mainly through hydro production. In particular, it uses
all the hydro production that is available but allocates it di®erently than in the competitive
model. Firm 1 allocates relatively less water to high demand periods and relatively more
water to the low demand periods (See Figure 11). This hydro allocation enlarges the di®erence
between peak and o®-peak periods, as opposed to what is observed under competition. This
e®ect is smaller the more elastic is demand.48 Firm 1's hydro scheduling strategy is consistent
46Uniqueness of equilibrium was not investigated theoretically but empirically. In particular, the simulation
was solved for 400 randomly chosen starting points. The model always converged to the same aggregated
equilibrium: prices, each ¯rm's total production (q1 ; q2), marginal cost, marginal value of water and pro¯ts.
The only exception is given by the Firm 1's production strategy: even though it is true that the equilibrium for
Firm 1's total production is unique, this is not true for its production strategy, i.e. the decision of how much
is produced from its thermal and hydro-storage plants(q1T h; q1h). Multiplicity of equilibrium is explained by
Firm 1 being able to allocate hydro production over time and by marginal cost being constant over relevant
intervals of output. Indeed, observe that the FOCs are in terms of MR and MC and that the MR is a function
of total sales and independent of what plants were used. This problem only a®ects Firm 1 as it is the only
one who is able to allocate hydro production over time and that is able to combine thermal and hydro plants
to produce a certain output level. I want to remark that in spite of this multiplicity of equilibrium, all the
qualitative conclusions hold and magnitudes are very similar. Values reported in the tables for q1h and q1th
are averages calculated over 400 di®erent estimations of the model.
47Strictly speaking, Firm 2 is not producing at capacity as it still has some thermal plants that are not
being run. However, the big di®erence observed between the marginal cost of Firm 2's next available plant
and the marginal plant at that demand level (almost $30) prevents Firm 2 from increasing production. By
contrast, Firm 1 has a large capacity at a relatively low marginal cost. See Figure 2.2
48It cannot be argued that the demand assumptions are driving the results. Even though I am implicitly
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with what has been found in the literature. In their study of the Norwegian electricity
market, Johnsen et al (1999) argued that "market power can not be exercised in markets
dominated by hydroelectric producers unless there are transmission constraints". The hydro
producer exploits di®erences in demand elasticity, reducing production when the constraint
is binding (and demand is less elastic). Notice that whether or not transmission constraints
bind has an impact on the elasticity of the residual demand faced by the Cournot producers
as imports/exports of energy take place (or not). My model results show that transmission
constraints are not a necessary condition for the exercise of market power by hydro producers.
Capacity constraints (supply constraints) will have the same e®ect. In other words if a hydro
producer competes with a thermal producer, the ¯rst one may choose to restrict production
when the thermal producer is capacity constrained, and to increase production the rest of
the time. In this way, one could say that Firm 1 faced a less elastic demand when Firm 2 is
capacity constrained. As a consequence, the shifting of hydro production is also the result of
Firm 1 exploiting di®erences in price elasticity.
Firm 1's large hydro capacity is the source of its market power. Accordingly, Firm 1
explicitly schedules its hydro production in order to exploit di®erences in price elasticity and
exercises as much market power as it can. However Firm 1 also exercises market power in a
less observable way, namely the use (or more strictly speaking the "no use") of its thermal
capacity. Indeed Firm 1 uses, on average, only 15% of its thermal capacity. If Firm 1's
thermal portfolio were in a third generator's portfolio, Firm 1 would be more constrained in
the exercise of its market power.49 On the other side, Firm 2's large thermal capacity was
not enough to enable it to exercise market power. Behind this result is the fact that a large
fraction of its capacity are baseload plants, which are usually not marginal and thus do not
set the market price.
Firm 1's markups are decreasing as the demand it faces falls and they go from 76% to
66%, with a weighted average of 72% when demand elasticity is -1/3 . The more elastic is
demand, the smaller are the Lerner Indices, as expected. Firm 2's markups do not exhibit
the same monotone pattern. In particular, the Lerner index is larger during the middle hours
(Table 9).50
The Cournot equilibrium is not only ine±cient because production falls short the com-
petitive equilibrium production level but also because costs of production are not minimized.
In particular, the Fringe is operating plants that are less e±cient (higher marginal cost) than
the ones that are being withheld by Firm 1 and hydro production is used to increase the
di®erence between peak and o® peak periods.51
A ¯nal question regarding the exercise of market power in this industry is who are the
winners and the losers. In order to analyze this issue, I calculated each ¯rm's producer
surplus, the consumer surplus and welfare (as the sum of producer and consumer surplus).
imposing that peak demand is less elastic than o®-peak demand (at a constant price) I am not imposing in
any way how the water should be allocated across periods. This is just a result of the model.
49In Chapter 7 I estimate the market equilibrium assuming that Firm 1's thermal portfolio is divested. In
particular, I analyze the impact of selling Firm 1's thermal portfolio to two di®erent set of agents: i) a unique
producer and ii) many small producers with no market power.
50The Lerner index shows market power that is exercised. Since Firm 2 is "capacity constrained", it
is probably not exercising market power. Consequently, Firm 2's Lerner index doesn't have an economic
meaning during those periods.
51The possibility of ine±cient dispatching was pointed out by Von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Borenstein
et al (2000) and Wolfram (1998).
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Results are reported in Table 10.
All of the producers are better o® when market power is exercised. As expected the
less elastic is demand, the better o® producers are and the worse o® consumers are as more
market power can be exercised. Observe that even though it is Firm 1 the one who is really
able to constrain production and drive prices up, the real winner, in relative terms, is Firm
2. The reason behind this result is clear: since Firm 2 is capacity constrained when demand
is high, its production level is very close to the competitive level but the price is considerable
higher.52 Finally notice that the increase in the producer surplus almost compensates the
consumer surplus' reduction, keeping welfare loss at a relatively low level.
6.3 Extensions to the Model
In order to evaluate how sensitive these results are to the assumptions used, I re-estimate the
model under two di®erent conditions. First, I analyze the e®ect of a smaller amount of water
in°ows being available to allocate over the planning horizon. This exercise is motivated by the
role hydro resources play in Firm 1's market power. Secondly, it is more realistic to think that
Firm 1 may prefer to schedule its hydro production over a longer planning horizon, saving
a fraction of the hydropower available in a particular month to be used in a later period.
Therefore, the e®ect of producers maximizing over an entire year rather than a month will
be studied.
6.3.1 Cournot equilibrium with reduced hydro in°ows.
The model was estimated assuming that the hydrology was "dry" rather than normal. In
particular, I assumed that hydro °ows were 60% of the °ows registered in a "normal" year.53
Since all hydro °ows are assumed to be smaller, the fringe is also smaller and residual demand
is relatively less elastic than in the base model. Data used to calculate residual demand are
reported in Table 11 while Cournot and Competitive Equilibrium for the E=-1/3 case are in
Tables 12 and 13. The results for the E=-0.1, E=-1/2, E=-2/3 and E=-1.0 are reported in
Appendix 1.
Hydro °ows are just enough to satisfy the minimum hydro production constraint; as a
consequence, Firm 1 and the Fringe have little hydro scheduling to do. In particular, the
Fringe is not able to schedule its plants di®erently than running them at minimum capacity.
Therefore the shape of the load curve is completely preserved and peaks are not eliminated,
just reduced by a very small amount.
Since hydro resources are not abundant as before, thermal capacity is more intensely used,
driving prices considerably higher than in the base cases - no matter whether the market is
competitive or not. The marginal value of water is also considerably higher as less e±cient
thermal plants must be dispatched in order to meet demand.
Results reported in Table 13 show that even under these extreme circumstances signi¯cant
unilateral market power can be exercised. However, while Firm 1's market power has been
reduced, Firm 2 now has the incentive and the ability to act strategically by withholding
supplies from the market to keep prices from falling further. Prices are lower than when
52Firm 1's pro¯ts are considerably larger than Firm 2's and so in absolute terms, the winner is Firm 1.
53Actual values for the 1998/99 year (the driest in the past 40 years) are 55%, 78% and 60% for hydro
reservoirs, ROR and total hydro °ows, respectively.
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Firm 1's hydro capacity was larger but at the same time, they are still above the competitive
equilibrium. Unlike what happened before, prices are increasingly di®erent the lower is
demand. How can this be explained? Observe that Firm 1 is capacity constrained when
demand is at its maximum level. Therefore, Firm 1 constrains more its thermal production
(relative to the competitive equilibrium) the lower is demand. In addition, and contrarily
to what was found before, relatively more water is allocated to periods of high demand and
relatively less to periods of low demand.54 Firm 1 behaves like a price taker when demand
is high and exercises some market power when demand is low. On the other hand, Firm 2
constrains more its (thermal) production when demand is high.
Firm 2 is still the producer who is bene¯ted the most by the exercise of market power, but
similarly to what happens to the remaining producers, its net bene¯t is smaller than when
hydro °ows are "normal" (see Table 14). Observe that in relative terms, consumers' loss is
smaller (relative to the competitive equilibrium) when hydro °ows are reduced as less market
power is exercised. Since this more than compensates the smaller increase in the producer
surplus, welfare loss is also smaller. The ¯nding that the welfare loss from the exercise of
market power is smaller when hydro °ows are reduced (as opposed to normal) does not mean
that in absolute terms society is also better o®. Indeed society is better o® when hydro °ows
are normal than dry, even if market power is exercised.
6.3.2 Hydro scheduling over a longer planning horizon
The model that has been used so far to analyze the exercise of market power in Chile's
electricity industry assumed that the hydro producer was able to allocate its hydro production
over a 1 month planning horizon. Indeed, the optimization problem solved by Firm 1 in that
model, assumed that the water left in the reservoir at the end of the period had no value;
accordingly, the incentive to use less water than what is available is reduced. In real life,
however, producers usually maximize over a longer time horizon, and thus it is reasonable to
expect them to save a fraction of their hydro °ows available in a particular month to be used
in a later period. An interesting question is whether Firm 1 would follow the same hydro
scheduling strategy that was found optimal in the 1-month model if the planning horizon were
longer. In particular, would Firm 1 exploit inter-month di®erences in demand elasticity by
moving water around? If so, then water should be stored in those months in which demand
is less elastic and released when demand is more elastic. According to Table 15, this means
that hydro production should be shifted from October, November and December to March,
January and the winter months (June-August).55
There are at least two di®erent approaches to investigate Firm 1's hydro scheduling strat-
egy over the year: analysis of the marginal value of water (MVW) and a direct estimation
of the model assuming that the planning horizon is longer. Since the data set required to
estimate a comprehensive 1-year version of the model is not available, and therefore many
54The shadow price of the minimum hydro production constraint is, for the ¯rst time, di®erent than zero.
In particular, Firm 1 is willing to pay to reduce the lower bound limit when demand is at medium and low
levels. Indeed it is willing to pay more the lower is the level of demand. This result is consistent with a
producer who is able to exercise market power only when demand is at medium-low levels.
55Market demand was parameterized as before, and thus it was assumed that price elasticity was -1/3 at
the peak anchor point. Residual demand is not constant throughout the year because must run production
and the Fringe's production °uctuates over the di®erent months.
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arbitrary assumptions would be needed, I will concentrate on the MVW analysis. A very
simple version of a 1-year model is analyzed and estimated in Appendix 2.
The basic idea behind the MVW analysis is the following: given that generators allocate
their hydro production in order to equalize the marginal revenue across periods (subject to
capacity and/or production constraints) and that in equilibrium marginal revenue is equal
to the MVW, it is possible to use the latter to determine the hydro scheduling strategy
(when is water stored/ when it is released) that the producer would follow over the year. In
particular, if min/max °ow constraints and min/max reservoir capacity constraints are not
binding, the MVW analysis would conclude that water in°ows are stored in months in which
water is cheap (low MVW) and released in months in which water is more expensive (high
MVW). In other words, hydro production would be shifted from low MR months to high
MR months. If the hydro scheduling strategy that I found that was optimal in the 1-month
model is also followed by producers over the year, I should ¯nd that: water is cheap (low
MVW) in October, November and December and more costly in March, January and the
winter months (June-August).56
In order to check for this hypothesis, I run the model and calculated the MVW for each
month of the year (Table 16). Observe that the MVW °uctuates over the year. Water is
more valuable in the ¯rst months of the year and less valuable in October, June, July and
November. Accordingly, if Firm 1 could reallocate hydro °ows throughout the year, it would
store a fraction of them in the second half of the year and would use them in the ¯rst half of
the next year.57 The MVW is positively correlated to the inter-month di®erences in demand
elasticity suggesting that the hydro scheduling strategy is consistent with the conclusions
of the 1-month model, as hydro production would be shifted from low demand elasticity
months (low MVW) to high demand elasticity months (High MVW). MVW is also positively
correlated to the intra-month variation of demand elasticity (°uctuations of demand elasticity
within each month). According to this evidence, the hydro producer would choose to "°ood"
the market not only when average residual demand is relatively more elastic (and hence the
market more competitive) but also when the di®erence between min/max demand and price
elasticity across periods is larger, reinforcing the ¯rst e®ect.
Even though the hydro producer has incentive to exploit inter-month di®erences in de-
mand elasticity, and intra-month demand °uctuations, the incentive is not strong enough to
completely explain the hydro scheduling strategy over a longer planning horizon. Indeed,
the correlation coe±cient between average elasticity of demand and the MVW and between
intra-month demand °uctuation and the MVW are relatively small (0.24 and 0.26 respec-
tively). Unlike that, the correlation between MVW and the ratio in°ows/net demand is very
strong (correlation coe±cient = -0.93) suggesting that producers store hydro °ows and re-
lease them across months according to how scarce these °ows are relative to demand. This
relationship being stronger implies that the value of water and its allocation over the year
is mainly explained by a traditional supply-demand analysis (i.e. store water when it is rel-
atively abundant) than by a market power argument (i.e. store water when demand is less
elastic).
56Winter in the Southern hemisphere goes from June 21st to September 21st. January, February and
September coincide with vacation periods. In addition, the ¯rst two months are in the middle of the summer.
AC use is not spread in Chile.
57This simple analysis does not take into account any technical constraint regardingmaximum and minimum
capacity of reservoirs.
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Why is it that Firm 1 would not schedule its hydro plants in order to exploit inter-
month di®erences in demand elasticity? There are, at least, two possible explanations. First,
producers may not need to allocate water from less elastic months to more elastic months in
order to exercise market power if they are already able to exercise it within a month. In the
1-month version of the model, I found that Firm 1 exercised market power by constraining
its hydro production in periods of high demand, as its rivals were capacity constrained and
by using the "stored" water when the market was more competitive (low demand). If there
is enough intra-month demand variability, it is more likely that there will be periods in
which the producer will be able to release the stored water without a big impact on the
market price. The Cournot equilibrium converging each month to the competitive equilibrium
as the demand level falls, indicates that the market is competitive a fraction of the time,
providing qualitative support to this argument.58 In order to check for this hypothesis more
formally, I estimated a calibrated version of the model assuming that there were only inter-
month di®erences in demand elasticity but no intra-month demand °uctuation. If it is true
that intra-month °uctuations are the reason why Firm 1 does not exploit di®erences in
demand elasticity across months, then the correlation coe±cient should be higher. Results
are reported in Table 17, column (2). As expected, the correlation coe±cient between the
elasticity of demand and the MVW is higher but only marginally. At the same time, the
relationship between the value of water and its availability (measured by the ratio in°ows/net
demand) is still very strong. These results suggest that the intra-month demand °uctuation
is only a second order explanation to the hydro scheduling strategy followed over the year.
Alternatively, Firm 1 may not have incentive to exercise market power by shifting water
from one month to another because inter-month di®erences in price elasticity are not big
enough. Remember that the 1-month model, and associated marginal value of water was
estimated assuming that the price elasticity of market demand for electricity was -1/3 at
the peak anchor point. Even though elasticity of residual demand °uctuates both intra and
inter-month as the size of the fringe and must run production varies, it may be possible that
this °uctuation is not su±ciently large. In order to check for this hypothesis, I estimated
the model assuming that the elasticity of market demand was di®erent over the year (but
constant within each month).59 As a result of larger di®erences in price elasticity (almost
ten times), the correlation between the marginal value of water and the average elasticity of
demand also increased; the correlation coe±cient amounted to 0.88 (Table 17, column (3)).
In other words, the larger are the di®erences in inter-month price elasticity of demand, the
greater the incentive to exercise market power by shifting water from one month to another
and the smaller the relationship between the availability of water relative to demand and
the value of water. The larger the inter-month di®erence, the closer is the hydro scheduling
strategy to the market power explanation and further from the traditional supply/demand
analysis.60
Summing up, producers exercise market power by exploiting di®erences in price elasticity,
58The correlation coe±cient between the price ratio Cournot/Competitive equilibrium and the MVW is
-0.72.
59It could take one of the following values: -0.1, -0.33, -0.5, -0.67, -1.0. These were randomly allocated to
each month.
60In order to completely discard that this e®ect is explained by greater demand °uctuation within each
month, I re-calibrated the model, assuming the same inter-month di®erence in price elasticity but no intra-
month °uctuation (Table 2.17, column (4)). The correlation coe±cient between the marginal value of water
and the average elasticity is almost unchanged.
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allocating too little supply to periods in which demand is relatively less elastic, and relatively
too much to periods with more elastic demand. This hydro scheduling strategy may be
observed no matter what the planning horizon of the model is; the only "requirement" is that
there is enough "inter-period" demand variability. The smaller the °uctuation, the closer is
the hydro scheduling strategy to the traditional supply-demand analysis' conclusions.
7 Mitigation Measures
Governments reforming electricity industries have taken di®erent approaches to deal with
similar market power problems. When Australia and Argentina de-regulated their power
industries, they disaggregated their generation sector into many small ¯rms that were later
privatized (or are supposed to be in the case of the remaining state-owned generation com-
panies). On the other hand, the newly formed generation ¯rms were privatized in Chile
and UK with large market shares. In the UK, however, ¯rms were privatized with a high
level of contracting (National Power with 87% and PowerGen with 88% at the moment of
privatization and 72% and 70% respectively after the ¯rst set of 1 year contracts expired).
Similarly generators in the New South Wales and Victoria markets (Australia) were required
to sell hedge contracts to retailers of electricity in a quantity enough to cover their franchise
market demand. The prices of these contracts were set by the state at fairly high levels.
Finally, regulatory threats have also been used to prevent the exercise of market power: after
the UK's regulatory agency threatened National Power and PowerGen to be referred to the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, the producers agreed on a price cap. They also agreed
to divest a fraction of their generating capacity to independent producers.61
In what follows I analyze two sets of measures that have been relatively successful in other
restructured electricity systems and that are feasible to implement in Chile. Since Firm 1's
large installed capacity, in particular its control of hydro-storage plants is the source of its
market power, it is reasonable to start analyzing the e®ect of requiring Firm 1 to divest some
of its plants.62 Divestiture of thermal and hydro plants will be analyzed separately. In the ¯rst
case, I will analyze the impact of transferring Firm 1's thermal plants to a single ¯rm with the
potential to exercise market power as well as transferring this capacity to small producers with
no market power. Secondly, I will study the e®ect of dispatching Firm 1's hydro storage plants
competitively. In particular, I will calculate the market equilibrium under two alternative
assumptions: i) the entire set of hydro storage plants is dispatched competitively and ii) only
some of them are. Finally, I will analyze the impact of requiring large generating companies to
contract a fraction of their production at ¯xed prices determined outside of the spot market.
In order to have a quantitative estimation of the real impact of these measures I used
GAMS/CONOPT to estimate di®erent versions of the original model, each of them adapted
to incorporate one of these mitigation measures. Even though the model results turned out
61For more detail on an international comparison on restructuring and regulation of the electric power
sector see Wolak (1999) and ENRE(1997).
62Similar exercises were done by Green and Newbery (1992) and Andersson and Bergman (1995). Green
and Newbery (1992) estimated what the market equilibrium would look like if the industry were a quintopoly
rather than a duopoly. They found that reduction in output, the price increase and the deadweight loss
would be considerably smaller. Andersson and Bergman (1995) analyzed the impact of i) splitting the
largest company in two ¯rms and ii) a merge between the six smallest generators. In both cases, the market
equilibrium was closer to the competitive equilibrium.
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to be sensitive to price elasticity of demand, I only report results for the E=-1/3 case, as
the more elastic is demand the less market power can be exercised, and the smaller the need
(and the relevance) of mitigation measures.
7.1 Firm 1's asset divestiture
7.1.1 Full divestiture of thermal plants.
A ¯rst alternative of asset divestiture is given by Firm 1 being allowed to keep its entire
hydro capacity but required to divest all of its thermal plants. Under these circumstances,
hydro scheduling is the only tool Firm 1 has to exercise market power.
Thermal plants may be sold to a single producer or to many small suppliers. Both
scenarios will be analyzed. If the entire thermal capacity were sold to a single producer
(Firm 3), three producers, a purely "hydro" producer (Firm 1) and two purely thermal
producers (Firms 2 and 3) would make up the industry. Newly created Firm 3's installed
capacity would be given by former Firm 1's thermal plants. The competitive Fringe would be
exactly the same as in the base Cournot model. Alternatively Firm 1's thermal plants may
be transferred to many small producers, in which case the industry would be made up by a
purely hydro, a purely thermal producer (Firms 1 and 2 respectively) and by a considerably
larger competitive fringe as it would also include Firm 1's former thermal plants. In what
follows, both cases will be referred to as "Triopoly" and "Duopoly with a larger thermal fringe
("DLTF") respectively. Table 18 reports the resulting distribution of installed capacity.
Marginal cost functions are plotted in Figure 13. Firm 1's original marginal cost function
is above Firm 2's over almost all the range. Notice that most of the plants that would be
sold are less e±cient than the ones that the Fringe already had.63
While producers in the Triopoly case would face exactly the same residual demand that
Firms 1 and 2 faced in the base model, the transfer of the thermal capacity to the Fringe in
the DLTF case would result on Cournot producers facing a smaller and more elastic residual
demand. In other words, in the ¯rst case, 3 producers (instead of only 2) "share" the same
cake, while in the second, the original two producers "share" a smaller cake. The other
elements of the model - Firm 1's hydro capacity (and constraints), Firm 2's marginal cost
function, must run generation, hydro resources available and hydro generation by the Fringe
- remain the same.
The optimization problem to be solved must be adapted to the new circumstances: i)
Firm 1 is a purely hydro producer and its only strategic decision is to schedule its hydro
plants and ii) the presence of a new producer (Firm 3) in the Triopoly case or a Fringe with
a larger thermal installed capacity (DLTF). Each ¯rm's maximization problem is given by:
Firm 1's Optimization problem
max
X
t
fPt(qt)q1htg subject to (15)
q1hM IN · q1ht · q1hMAX 8t (16)X
t
q1ht · q1htot (17)
63Given that the linear approximations used are not exactly the same, results from the di®erent models are
not completely comparable
28
Firms 2 and 3's optimization problem (i=2,3)
max
X
t
fPt(qt)(qiT ht) ¡ CTi(qiT ht)g (18)
qiThMIN · qit · qiT hMAX 8t (19)
Relevant FOCs:
@L
@q1ht
= Pt(qt) + q1ht
@Pt(qt)
@qt
¡ °1t + ±1t ¡ ¾ 1 = 0 8t (20)
@L
@qiTht
= Pt(qt) + (qiT ht)
@Pt(qt)
@qt
¡ @CTi(qiT ht)
@qt
¡ ¸it + ®it = 0 8t, i = 2; 3 (21)
These conditions can be reformulated as follows:
(200) MR1t = ¾1 + °1t ¡ ±1t = -1t
(210) MRit = ci + ¸it ¡ ®it
As before, thermal generators produce until marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Firm
1 equalizes marginal revenue to the marginal value of water but this value is no longer linked
to thermal marginal cost.64 The marginal value of water indicates how much total pro¯ts
would increase by having an additional unit of water available. In the case of a producer
with a mixed thermal/hydro portfolio, an additional unit of water would replace production
from the least e±cient thermal plant that is in use and pro¯ts would increase by the cost of
production that has been saved. Therefore, in equilibrium the marginal value of water must
be equal to the marginal cost. In the case of a purely "hydro producer" this link no longer
exists. In this case, the only way a hydro producer may increase his pro¯ts is by changing
the hydro scheduling. Under these circumstances, the marginal value of water indicates how
much pro¯ts would change as a consequence of having rescheduled hydro production if an
additional unit of water became available.
A priori it is not possible to know what circumstances (triopoly or DLTF model) are more
suitable for the exercise of market power. In both of them there are elements that increase
market power while others reduce it (number of producers, size of the residual market, price
elasticity of demand). In order to analyze this issue, I will focus on two results of the
simulation: hydro scheduling and Firms 2 and 3 Lerner Indices.65
Results for both models are reported in Tables 19 and 20.66 Prices are higher and output
lower in the Triopoly model than in the DLTF model; both results are in between the base
case and the competitive equilibrium (See Figures 14 and 15). Reduction in prices and the
increase in total output when compared to the base case, may lead us to, mistakenly, conclude
that each Cournot producer exercises less market power.
In Chapter 6 I found that Firm 1 exercised market power by reducing hydro production
when demand was high and by increasing it when demand was low (relative to the competitive
64Marginal revenue is equal to the marginal value of water if minimum and maximum hydro production
constraints are not binding. Otherwise, min/max hydro production shadow prices must be added.
65In the case of Firm 1 there is no thermal marginal cost. Consequently it is not reasonable to talk of
markups in the sense of Lerner Indices. This is not a problem. Since Firm 1's only tool available to exercise
market power is the scheduling of its hydro-storage plants, it is this variable and not markups what should
be the focus of the analysis of Firm 1's market power.
66Equilibrium IS unique.
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equilibrium). Exactly the same strategy (and in similar amounts) is carried out when Firm
1 is a purely hydro producer (See Figure 16). Firm 1's ability to exercise market power is
reduced but not by much. These results also suggest that Firm 1 exercises more market
power in the Triopoly than in the DLTF case.
In the base case, Firm 1 has so much market power, and can drive prices up by so much,
especially when demand is high, that Firm 2's optimal strategy is to produce at capacity.
Firm 2 is able to exercise market power only when demand is low. As Firm 1's installed
capacity is reduced, Firm 2's relative position in the market is strengthened. As a result,
Firm 2 constrains its production (relative to the competitive equilibrium and to the base
model) in the intermediate and low demand levels, but it is still pro¯table to produce at
capacity when demand is high (Figure 17). In addition Firm 2 is able to exercise more
market power in the Triopoly case, as there is another player who stands up against Firm 1.
Firm 1 exercises (a little) less market power while Firm 2 exercises relatively more. How is
it then that total output is higher and prices are lower? The answer to this question is given
by the owner(s) of former Firm 1's thermal plants increasing production enormously. As it
can be seen in Figures 18 and 19, former Firm 1's thermal plants produce at a considerably
higher rate after being divested. This increase is larger the lower is the demand level. It is
also larger when the plants are sold to small producers with no market power than when they
are sold to a single producer. Under these circumstances, Firm 3 would enjoy some market
power and would exercise it at all demand levels except when demand is at its maximum.
Even when these thermal plants are used to exercise market power and thus are dispatched
at reduced levels relative to the competitive equilibrium, these levels are still considerably
larger than when the plants were in Firm 1's hands. Indeed, production is large enough to
more than compensate any reduction in production by the other Cournot producers (Figures
15 and 19). Finally, it should be noticed that the allocation is still ine±cient but less than
in the base model.67
Table 21 reports the e®ect of Firm 1's thermal plants divestiture on total pro¯ts. Firms
1 and 2 are worse o® after the divestiture of Firm 1's thermal plants. As expected, they are
marginally better o® in the Triopoly than in the DLTF case. Using Firm 3's pro¯ts as a proxy
of the equivalent annuity of the amount paid for Firm 1's thermal plants, one can see that
Firm 1 is at its best when it controls its original mixed thermal/hydro portfolio. If required
to sell its thermal portfolio, it prefers to sell them to a unique seller who enjoys some market
power and thus is willing to pay for it. Notice that even though Firm 2's relative position in
the market is strengthened as Firm 1 is stripped o® its thermal plants, and thus it is able to
exercise market power, its pro¯ts (and markups) are considerably lower. Firm 2 would still
have been better o® by taking advantage of Firm 1's original market power.
Summarizing: as a result of the divestiture of its thermal plants, Firm 1's market power
is reduced but in no case eliminated. Indeed, Firm 1 retains its hydro capacity, which is the
tool it uses to exercise market power. As a result, Firm 1's scheduling of its hydro plants
is closer to the e±cient allocation but it still exhibits the pattern of "less hydro production
when demand is high and more hydro production when demand is low". At the same time,
Firm 2 is able to constrain its production, in particular when demand is at medium and low
levels. Even though both producers are able to exercise market power - in more or less degree
67In other words, Firm 2 could produce a fraction of what is currently being produced by the Fringe at a
lower marginal cost.
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- the market equilibrium (and welfare) is closer to the competitive equilibrium as former Firm
1's thermal plants are more intensely used. This is true even when those plants are sold to a
single producer who is able to exercise market power at certain demand levels.
7.1.2 Divestiture of hydro resources
In the previous Chapter, I found that the source of Firm 1's market power is the strategic
management of its hydro-storage plants. Accordingly, another policy that may be imple-
mented to mitigate the exercise of market power is to dispatch Firm 1's hydro storage plants
competitively. Firm 1 may be entitled to keep the property of these plants but to transfer
its management to an independent agent such as the CDEC, who is currently in charge of
the operation of the system.68 Under these circumstances, Firm 1 would only be able to use
strategically its thermal capacity.
As a result, the industry would be made up by two large thermal producers (Firms 1 and 2)
who play Cournot and by a price-taking fringe that owns a small fraction of thermal capacity
but the entire hydro capacity of the system. This version of the model will be referred to as
"Duopoly with a large hydro fringe" - DLHF. Installed capacity would be distributed among
producers as it is reported in Table 22.
Notice that there is a change in the relative position of each ¯rm in the market: the
biggest ¯rm in the industry is no longer Firm 1 but Firm 2. Supply and demand side of the
model are basically the same as in the base model. The only di®erence is that in this case
the entire system's hydro production from reservoirs is distributed across periods according
to a peak shaving strategy (See Table 23).69 Accordingly, Cournot producers face a smaller
and more elastic residual demand.70
The importance of hydro production is clearly observed in Figures 20 and 21. In the base
case, the Fringe owned relatively small hydro storage plants and thus the amount of hydro
production that could be allocated through a peak shaving strategy was also small. Peaks
were only slightly reduced and the shape of the "shaved load curve" (i.e. total demand - hydro
generation) remained mostly the same. In the DLHF model, the entire hydro production is
scheduled competitively. In this case, hydro generation is large enough to °atten demand
over almost all the period. This means that the shaved load curve is almost °at during a
large fraction of the month, eliminating the peaks. Because of the anchors that I used (same
price and same slope) this result translates into equal residual demands over the ¯rst four
periods (Figure 21).
Since Firm 1 does not have hydro resources to allocate across periods, the optimization
problem is completely static. There are no interactions between one period and another;
each producer treats each period as a di®erent and independent market. Each ¯rm's (i=1,2)
68Transferring these plants to many small producers is probably ine±cient as the operation of the hydro
system would be extremely di±cult. In addition, transferring all the hydro plants to a unique producer would
not work either as it was analyzed in the Triopoly version of the model.
69In this case, a peak shaving strategy consists in allocating more hydro production to the periods of higher
demand. Hydro-ROR plants are still assumed to be must run plants.
70The residual demand faced by Cournot producers in this case is relatively more elastic than in the base
case the higher is the demand level.
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maximization problem is given by
max
X
t
fPt(qt)(qiTht) ¡ CTi(qiT ht)g subject to (22)
qiT hMIN · qit · qiThMAX 8t (23)
The solution to this problem is given by six di®erent and independent FOCs for each ¯rm
(equations 24 and 24'). In equilibrium each ¯rm adjusts its production rate until marginal
revenue equals marginal cost (corrected by shadow prices if appropriate)
@L
@qiT ht
= Pt(qt) + (qiT ht)
@Pt(qt)
@qt
¡ @CTi(qiTht)
@qt
¡ ¸it + ®it = 0 8t (24)
(240) MRi = ci + ¸it ¡ ®it 8t
Results are reported in Table 24.71 Thermal quantities and prices are the same in the ¯rst
four periods, a result expected given that after allocating hydro production through a peak
shaving strategy, residual demands were the same in those periods (Figure 21).
Producers charge a price that is in between the one that would be charged in a compet-
itive market and in the base model. Prices and total output are considerably closer to the
competitive equilibrium. This e®ect is more signi¯ cant when demand is at high and medium
levels, which are precisely the periods when Firm 1 was able to exercise more market power.
The increase in total output is not the result of all producers increasing uniformly its pro-
duction. On the contrary, observe what happens to the use of thermal capacity, the only
resource that can be used strategically in this model. While Firm 1 increases the use of its
plants, Firm 2 reduces it. In a completely "thermal" game, it is Firm 2 and not Firm 1 who
really enjoys market power.
Since hydro plants are dispatched competitively, hydro production is larger (with respect
to the base case) when demand is high and is smaller when demand is low. Total output
increases when demand is at high and medium levels because the increase in hydro production
and Firm 1's thermal production more than compensate Firm 2's and the fringe's reduced
thermal production (Figures 22-27).
According to Table 25, requiring Firm 1 to dispose of its hydro plants e®ectively reduces
its market power. In fact, the industry reduces its average markup from 61.5% to 40.1%.
Reduction in average markup is, however, not a generalized result. Indeed Firm 2 increases
its average markup (from 44% to 48%) while Firm 1 reduces it (from 72% to 26%).
Even though Firm 2 is, this time, able to exercise market power, it would have been better
o® by taking advantage of the greater market power that Firm 1 could exercise when it had
all of its capacity. On the other hand, although Firm 1's thermal plants are more intensely
used and that pro¯ts earned directly from these plants increased by almost 4 times, this is
not enough to make up for the (direct) reduction in pro¯ts that results from the loss of its
ability to schedule its hydro plants unrestricted, as thermal plants represented only 7% of
Firm 1's total pro¯ts in the base case. Indeed, Firm 1's total pro¯ts are only 17% of what
it earned in the base case. On the aggregate, however, Firm 1 is not considerably worse o®.
In fact, when the revenue from the sale of its hydro plants is considered, Firm 1's "adjusted-
71Equilibrium is unique.
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pro¯ts" are only 3% lower than when it had all of its capacity. (Table 26).72 How is it that
prices can go down so much and there be a small e®ect on Firm 1's pro¯ts? The explanation
is twofold. On the one hand, prices are lower than in the base case but still higher than what
would be observed under perfect competition, as Firm 2 is able to exercise market power.
On the other hand, former Firm 1's hydro plants are more intensely used in the periods of
high demand, when the price is higher, and less intensely used in the periods of low demand,
when the price is lower, as opposed to the hydro scheduling strategy used by Firm 1 when
it enjoyed market power. As a result, pro¯ts earned from former Firm 1's hydro plants are
lower than in the base case, but only by 15%, and they are still 20% higher than under perfect
competition. This e®ect along with the increased pro¯ts Firm 1 earns from its thermal plants
explains the result.
As a ¯nal exercise of Firm 1's assets divestiture, I analyzed the impact of requiring Firm
1 to divest only its largest hydro system, "Laja". Under these circumstances, Firm 1 would
only be able to strategically schedule 42% of the system's total hydro production as opposed
to 87% in the base model.73 This model will be referred to as "Duopoly with a medium
hydro fringe - DMHF". See Table 22 for the resulting distribution of installed capacity.
The most interesting result (Table 27) is how each ¯rm's relative position in the market
changes with the demand level. In the base model, we found that Firm 1 was the one that
really enjoyed market power, while in the purely thermal game (DLHF), it was Firm 2. In
this "in-between" model, both ¯rms seem to enjoy market power, although who can really
exercise it varies with the demand level. When demand is at its peak, Firm 1 is the one who
constrains its production; Firm 2's optimal strategy is to produce at capacity. Unlike that, in
the middle hours, it is Firm 2 the one that enjoys market power; Firm 1's production closely
resembles its production in the DLHF model - when its market power was reduced (Figures
22-27).74
Summarizing: while the disposal of Firm 1's hydro-storage plants considerably weakens its
relative position in the market, Firm 2's is strengthened. Indeed, Firm 2's relative position in
the market is the strongest when the entire set of Firm 1's plants is dispatched competitively.
Even though Firm 2 is able to e®ectively exercise market power, the market equilibrium is
closer to the competitive equilibrium as total output is considerably larger.
7.1.3 Firm 1's asset divestiture: Comparison and welfare analysis
Alternative forms of Firm 1's asset divestiture have been analyzed. I found that the incentives
to exercise market power, even though smaller, are not reduced signi¯ cantly since Firm 2 is
left in a position that enables it to withhold output to keep prices up from the competitive
level. As a consequence of its installed capacity being reduced, Firm 1's relative position in
the market is weakened while Firm 2's is strengthened. This result is particularly important
when Firm 1 is prevented from strategically dispatching its hydro storage capacity, as it is
the main tool it has to exercise market power. It is in this case that Firm 2's position is the
strongest and exercises the most market power, while Firm 1 exercises the least.
72As in the previous exercise I am using the pro¯ts earned by the owner of former Firm 1's hydro plants
as a proxy of the equivalent annuity of the amount paid for those plants.
73As a consequence of a larger share of hydro production being allocated competitively, the shaved load
curve exhibits smaller peaks than in the base model. In fact, during the middle hours, shaved demand is
almost constant.
74Estimated equilibrium is unique except for Firm 1's production strategy.
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In order to evaluate these policies, a welfare index was calculated as the sum of the
producer and consumer surplus (See Table 28). Observe that the four alternatives of asset
divestiture are very similar in terms of welfare, the producer surplus and consumer surplus
change. If any of these measures were implemented, welfare would be between 2.7 - 3.3%
higher than when Firm 1 has its entire capacity and is able to exercise market power (base
case) and between 1.0 - 1.5% less than if the market were perfectly competitive.75 This result
is explained by a reduction in the producer surplus (between 9 and 15%) and an increase in
the consumer surplus (between 14 and 21%) when compared to the base case.76;77
Aggregate results across the mitigation measures analyzed being similar does not mean
that the di®erent forms of Firm 1's asset divestiture are equivalent. On the contrary, this
similarity hides important distributive di®erences. Firm 1's direct pro¯ts are considerably
more a®ected when it is not allowed to schedule its hydro plants strategically; a reasonable
result given that its hydro capacity is the source of its market power. However, once revenues
from the sales of its assets are taken into account, Firm 1 is almost indi®erent between the
four di®erent alternatives that have been analyzed. However, Firm 2 and the "initial" fringe
are not.78 Indeed, the reduction in the producer surplus that would be observed if Firm 1's
ability to exercise market power were constrained by any of the analyzed measures, would be
almost completely explained by the smaller pro¯ts earned by Firm 2 and the Fringe. They
are certainly not indi®erent among the di®erent forms of Firm 1's assets divestiture. They
strongly prefer the status quo, and if that is not possible, they prefer the alternative that
keeps more market power in the hands of Firm 1 (Triopoly over DLTF and DMHF over
DLHF). On the consumer side, exactly the opposite happens. Consumers are better o® the
less market power can be exercised by Firm 1. Regulatory authorities will have to keep in
mind the distributional e®ects that may take place as a result of each form of Firm 1's asset
divestiture.79
Requiring the largest producer to divest some of its generating capacity to create more
competitors does not eliminate the incentives or the ability to exercise market power, as under
those circumstances, both ¯rms are able to constrain their production in di®erent amounts.
The main di®erence in this regard is that Firm 2 holds a stronger position in the market.
At the same time, however, market equilibrium is considerably closer to the competitive
equilibrium not only in terms of levels (prices and output) but also in terms of the allocation
of resources. This result is explained by former Firm 1's plants (either thermal or hydro
storage) being more intensely and e±ciently used, an outcome that should not come as a
75The measure of welfare loss used does not take into account ine±ciencies that may result from producers
allocating resources to maintain their market power, such as lobbying or, more generally, any deterring
competition practice. Dynamic elements, such as entry, were not included either. If the high prices that
result from the exercise of market power attract excessive entry as in Green and Newbery (1992) then the
welfare loss would be larger.
76Given that none of these measures completely eliminates the exercise of market power, the producer
surplus is still higher (between 18 and 27%) and the consumer surplus is still lower (between 12 and 17%)
than what would be observed if the market were perfectly competitive.
77When compared to the base case, welfare only improves slightly as most of the reduction in the producer
surplus is compensated by an increase in the consumer surplus. This result is not a surprise given that I
assumed that market demand was relatively inelastic (E=-1/3 at the peak anchor point).
78By the "initial" fringe I refer to the small producers that were present in the industry before any Firm
1's asset divestiture took place. In other words, it does not include the new owners of former Firm 1's plants.
79In order to analyze the convenience of deregulating the system and implementing any of the policies that
have been proposed, one should also do a welfare analysis of the current regulation.
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surprise since a large fraction of the capacity that was kept out of the market by Firm 1 were
low-marginal cost plants. The resulting higher (and more e±cient) production level more
than compensates any reduction in production carried out by Cournot producers.
7.2 Forward contracting
As a ¯nal component of the analysis I analyze the impact of contracting practices. I assume
that - for reasons that will be later discussed - generators and buyers meet in a contract market
and sign contracts for a certain amount of energy and price ("strike price"). In particular,
I assume that these contracts take the form of "two-way options", i.e. both parties deal
with the spot market and the consumer (producer) is compensated for the di®erence between
the spot price (P) and the strike price (W) if P>W (P<W). Contracts are private and are
arranged before the spot market meets. After these contracts are signed, both parties (and
possibly some others) meet again in the spot market. The contract price may be determined
in di®erent ways (by regulators, as a function of the expected spot price, and so on) but once
it is set, it is not changed and thus has no direct e®ect on the spot price.
In order to quantitatively analyze the e®ect of contracting practices, each ¯rm's objective
function must be modi¯ed as follows:
max
X
t
fPt(qt)(qit ¡ kit) ¡ CTi(qiT ht) + kitWitg i = 1; 2 (25)
where kit is the contracted quantity and Wit is the contracted price. The last term indicates
the ¯xed revenue the ¯rm gets from its contracts. This term has no e®ect in the solution
of the model, as the contracted quantity and price were determined outside the spot market
(and before this market meets).
FOCs are:80
@L
@qit
= Pt(qt) + (qit ¡ kit) @Pt(qt)@qit ¡
@CTi(qit)
@qit
= 0 8t (26)
(260)M Rit = cit 8t
The producer equalizes marginal revenue to marginal cost, but marginal revenue is not a
function of the ¯rm's total production, as before, but only of the level of production that
is actually sold in the spot market. Notice that the smaller is this term, the closer is the
marginal revenue to the price level, and the closer the "market power" equilibrium to the
competitive equilibrium. Equation (26') can be used to analyze the impact of being over (k>q)
or under (k<q) contracted. When the producer is under-contracted, the market outcome will
lie somewhere between the perfect competition and the no-contract equilibrium. When the
producer is over-contracted (k>q), it does not behave as a net seller in the market but as a
net buyer. In that case, the producer is no longer interested in driving prices up, but instead,
it wants to drive prices down (and below marginal cost).
80For simplicity I am maximizing over q1t rather than over q1ht and q1Tht: Qualitative results regarding
hydro scheduling and thermal/hydro split of production remain the same. I do not report ¯rst order conditions
for minimum and maximum capacity constraints.
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The competitive equilibrium will be the benchmark used to calculate the level of contract-
ing at a certain time. In particular, when I say that the contracting level is x% I will mean
that the contracted quantity (k) is given by x% of the load that the ¯rm would be expected
to generate under perfect competition. This approach allows me to incorporate the fact that
the contracted quantity is not constant across the month.81
Results for di®erent contracting levels (0%, 50% and 100%) are reported in Tables 29-
31. As before, results will be reported for the case in which price elasticity of demand is
-1/3.82 Notice that when k=0 we go back to the original base model and that when the ¯rms
are "fully contracted" (contracting level = 100%) results are very close to the competitive
equilibrium.83
As expected, the more contracted the ¯rms are, the lower are the prices and markups and
the higher is output. In particular, when the ¯rms are "fully contracted" the equilibrium is
very close to the competitive equilibrium. In addition, prices tend to be closer to marginal
cost as the contracting level increases; indeed when Firm 1 is over-contracted (t=5 for a
contracting level of 100%) price is lower than marginal cost as predicted by the theory.
Total production increases with the contracting level, as has also been found in the lit-
erature. Two additional results are worth noting. First, notice that as the contracting level
increases, Firm 2 loses all the market power that it had before. In the previous Chapter I
found that Firm 2 could only exercise market power when demand was low, because in the
remaining periods it was capacity constrained. However, when producers sell contracts and
the contracted quantity is su±ciently large, Firm 2 cannot exercise market power even in
those low demand periods. Secondly, observe what happens to Firm 1's production level. In
addition to the fact that it produces more the more contracted it is (Figure 32) there is an
important change in the way hydro production is scheduled (Figure 30). There may be two
e®ects in place at the same time. On the one hand, I expect that the more contracted is the
¯rm, the more e±cient is its hydro scheduling. I also expect that the ¯rm would allocate
more production to those periods when it is over-contracted so as to drive the price down.
What we observe is that as the contracting level increases, hydro scheduling is closer to the
e±cient (competitive) allocation. As a consequence, contracting practices result in gains in
both productive and allocative e±ciency. In addition, Firm 1 uses (relatively) more water
when it is under-contracted (high demand periods) and less when it is over-contracted (when
compared to the PC equilibrium). This implies that the contracting practices' "distortion
reducing e®ect" dominates the second e®ect. Indeed, Firm 1 increases total production when
it is over-contracted by relying as heavily as it can on its thermal plants; notice how closely
is thermal production to the competitive equilibrium (Figure 32).
Note as well that my results di®er from what was found by Scott (1998) regarding the
impact of contracting practices on hydro production. He found a positive relationship between
hydro production and the contracting level. According to my results, the higher is the
contracting level, the closer is hydro scheduling to the optimal allocation, meaning that more
81Unfortunately I do not have good information regarding contracting practices in Chile. I only have data
on the annual level of contracting but there is no additional information regarding how it is distributed across
the year, if there is any particular relationship with capacity, etc.
82Conclusions are the same for the remaining cases.
83Notice that a contracting level of 100% does not mean that contracted quantity = production (k=q).
How much the ¯rm will produce at every period is an endogenous variable and thus di±cult to predict with
certainty at the time contracts are signed.
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is produced from hydro sources when demand is high and less is produced in low demand
periods.
The more contracted the ¯rm is, the higher is the marginal value of water, a result that
is consistent with Scott (1998)'s ¯ndings for the electricity market in New Zealand (Table
32). The intuition behind this result is the following: the more contracted the ¯rm is, the
more it produces and given that the marginal cost function is increasing, the more costly it is
to produce. In equilibrium the marginal value of water has to be equal to thermal marginal
cost, and thus the more the ¯rm wants to produce, the more valuable is water.
Do contracting practices help to mitigate market power? According to Table 33, the
answer is yes. Firm 1's Lerner Indices are notably lower the more contracted the ¯rm is.84
This is in line with the role contracts have had in the UK, where according to Newbery
(1997) "[they] have turned out to be absolutely critical for introducing competition". By
selling contracts, Firms 1 and 2 give up to some or most of their market power. As a result,
the production level is closer to the competitive equilibrium and productive and allocative
e±ciency greatly improve.85
These results suggest that generators engaging in forward contracting would greatly reduce
their incentives to exercise market power. A related and very important issue is whether the
contract market will develop or not. Four di®erent lines of reasoning for the development of
the contract market have been discussed in the literature.86 Wolak (2000) and Allaz and Vila
(1993) argued that producers sell contracts in order to improve their situation in the spot
market. This argument is probably weak as demand for electricity is relatively inelastic and
the result is sensitive to the Cournot assumption. In second place, Green (1999) and Powell
(1993) argued that producers might sell contracts, even if this results in their position in the
spot market being weakened, if there are risk averse buyers willing to pay a premium in order
to be risk protected. Powell (1993) showed that buyers might exhibit strategic behavior and
buy contracts, even at a premium price, as a way to prevent producers from exercising market
power in the spot market. This result holds even if the buyers are risk neutral. Finally, Wolak
(2000), Powell (1993) and Green (1999) showed the role that regulation had in the birth of
the contract market in Australia and England and Wales.
A priori it is di±cult to know whether the conditions will be appropriate for the develop-
ment of a voluntary contract market in the post deregulation electricity industry in Chile. At
this time, all that can be done is to conjecture. It is clear that in the transition period from
the system that is in place today to a deregulated system, regulation that requires retailers to
purchase hedge contracts in a quantity enough to cover their monopoly franchise demand may
be needed.87 However, at a certain time, these mandatory contracts will necessarily expire,
84Notice that the markup is negative for t=5, contracting = 100% indicating that the price is less than the
marginal cost. This result is consistent with what we expected for periods when the ¯rm is over-contracted.
85Unfortunately it is not possible to carry out a welfare analysis as it was done in the previous section
because that would require too many arbitrary assumptions (risk attitude of the agents, an estimation of the
risk premium, estimation of the contract price and expected spot price, etc.)
86For more detail, see Chapter 2.
87The contracted pricewill probably not be important for the development of the market but it will certainly
have signi¯cant distributional e®ects. There are di®erent approaches that may be used to set the strike price
in the vesting contracts. An alternative is to continue calculating the regulated price, using a similar but
improved methodology than the one that is used today (currently the regulated price is supposed to be an
average of forecasted spot prices in a competitive market). This calculated price could be used as an anchor
for the contracts' strike price. For instance it could be used as a price cap or as the middle point in a +/-
x% band where the strike price could be allowed to °uctuate. The latter us is less restrictive than directly
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and if the authority wants to rely on the contract market to prevent producers from exercising
market power, it must ensure that conditions will be given for this market to develop.
Green (1999) and Powell (1993) have emphasized the role that risk averse buyers might
have in this regard. In order to analyze whether buyers in Chile are risk averse or not, one
needs to examine who these buyers are and what do they purchase electricity for. In the case
of large consumers who use electricity as an input of production, it is reasonable to expect
them to be risk averse, as they usually sell on very thin margins. Accordingly, they would
probably be willing to pay a hedging premium for their purchased contracts. Unfortunately
the number of large consumers that are entitled to contract with generators is small and
certainly not enough to guarantee the development of a deep contract market.88
A second set of potential buyers of contracts are the distribution companies. How inter-
ested these ¯rms are in voluntarily contracting strongly depends on the regulation of the price
charged to end-consumers. If they are allowed to completely pass through the "generation"
price, it is very likely that they will have no incentive at all to contract. On the other side,
if the ¯nal price is ¯xed (and constant) they would face the risk of any spot price change
and thus would be more inclined to contract. Forcing distribution companies to contract, for
instance by not giving them access to the spot market or by mandating them to contract a
certain quantity, may be a dangerous policy. Even though it may result in a deepening (or
a development) of the credit market, it may also result in anticompetitive practices at the
same time. Think for instance on a distribution company required to be fully contracted and
allowed to completely pass through the contracted price to end consumers. If at the same
time, and for any reason, generation companies have incentives to contract, distribution com-
panies may feel free to ask for certain "rewards" in order to be willing to sign the contracts.
These rewards will most likely come in the form of privileges that go against the development
or the functioning of a competitive spot market.89
Producers and buyers engaging in contracting practices is an insurance against market
power abuses in the spot market, as the more contracted generators are, the closer is the
outcome to the competitive equilibrium. Unfortunately, the development of the contract
market is not always guaranteed as it has been showed in the literature. If the Chilean
authority wishes to rely on the contract market to mitigate market power, it must have to
be extremely careful in the incentives the regulation provides for the parties to voluntarily
contract. Focusing only in the regulation of the contract market is not only insu±cient but
also myopic. Vesting contracts will expire sooner or later and at that time, it would be
the regulation of the whole industry the one that will be key in providing the incentives to
contract. A ¯nal warning regarding the importance of appropriate regulation and how much
it is desirable to rely on the contract market is given by Powell (1993)'s results: the more
opportunities producers have to cooperate, the more partial (as opposed to full) hedging
results.
imposing a price and allows the contracting parties to some degree of negotiation. In addition, if the regulated
price were truly a good forecast of the competitive price, as it is supposed to be, the contract price would
also be a good proxy.
88Large consumers in Chile are those whose maximum demand is greater than 2 MW. They amount to
a negligible fraction of consumers and 50% of total consumption (more than 30% of it is located inside the
distribution companies' franchise market and thus are not really free to choose who to contract with).
89This is exactly what currently happens in Chile.
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8 Conclusions
Currently Chilean authorities are evaluating the desirability of moving one step forward in
the de-regulation process; in particular they are analyzing the costs and bene¯ts of imple-
menting an unregulated spot wholesale electricity market system. Concerns have been raised
that this step will make it possible for generators to exercise market power due to the high
concentration of generation ownership that the industry exhibits, resulting in signi¯ cantly
higher spot market prices. The incentives and ability of Chilean generators would have to
exercise market power were analyzed in this paper. In addition, complementary measures
that could be implemented to mitigate market power were evaluated.
The analysis was carried out modeling Chile's electricity industry as a Cournot duopoly
(Firms 1 and 2) with a competitive fringe. The model assumes that both producers own
thermal plants but only one of them (Firm 1) also owns hydro-storage plants. These plants
turned out to be very important because they allowed the producer to store water (and
power) and to allocate it over a certain planning horizon at its convenience. This alternative
was not available to Firm 2. There are two elements of the model that should be kept
in mind when analyzing its results. First of all, results in general, and the magnitude of
distortions in particular, depend on the demand elasticity. The approach taken in this paper
was to estimate the model assuming di®erent parameters for the demand elasticity. Because
of the importance of this parameter in the ¯nal result, more rigorous research in this topic
is required for the Chilean case. Secondly, the model has no dynamic elements although a
power exchange system is clearly a perfect scenario for repeated competition. It is reasonable
to think that this omission results in my model underestimating market power.
Quantitative simulations of producers' behavior showed that if an unregulated spot market
were implemented in Chile's electricity industry, generators would have the incentive and the
ability to exercise market power, raising prices signi¯cantly above competitive levels. In
particular, Firm 1 would keep its thermal plants outside of the market and would allocate
its hydro resources in order to take advantage of di®erences in price elasticity of demand;
this means allocating too little supply to high demand periods and too much to low demand
periods (relative to the competitive equilibrium). As a consequence, di®erences between peak
and o® peak periods would be enlarged rather than reduced (as it would be the case if the
market were competitive). On the other side, Firm 2 would not be able to use its large
thermal portfolio to exercise market power most of the time. In fact, when demand is high,
Firm 1 has so much market power and can drive prices up by so much that Firm 2's best
strategy is to produce at capacity. Firm 2 is able to constrain its production only when
demand is low. Results slightly change when hydro °ows are reduced, as it is Firm 2 the one
who really enjoys and exercises market power.
Conditions for the exercise of market power are more favorable the more inelastic is
demand, an expected result. However, since in this case a generator is able to "shift power"
from one period to another, there is an additional element that must be looked at when
diagnosing market power: the inter-period di®erences in price elasticity. In particular, the
larger the di®erence of price elasticity of demand across periods, the greater the incentive
Firm 1 has to exercise market power by shifting hydro production from one period to another.
This result applies no matter the length of the planning horizon assumed in the model.
Two sets of policies that mitigate market power by (a) breaking up the largest generating
company through divestiture of generating capacity and (b) by imposing ¯xed price forward
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supply contracts on varying amounts of the capacity owned by ¯rms with market power
were evaluated. Even though both ¯rms would still be able to exercise a certain degree of
market power, the divestiture of Firm 1's assets, either thermal or hydro storage plants, would
turn the market equilibrium closer to the competitive equilibrium not only in terms of levels
(prices and output) but also in terms of the allocation of resources as former Firm 1's plants
(either thermal or hydro storage) would be more intensely used and this would more than
compensate any reduction in production by the Cournot producers. The di®erent forms of
Firm 1's assets divestiture that were analyzed have a similar e®ect on aggregate welfare but
there are big di®erences in terms of the change at the ¯rm and consumer level. In particular,
the more market power Firm 1 is able to exercise, the better o® are Firm 2 and the Fringe and
the worse o® are the consumers. Regulatory authorities must be aware of the distributional
e®ects that may take place as a result of each form of Firm 1's asset divestiture. The market
power mitigation role of contracting practices was also analyzed. I found that the more
contracted the ¯rms are, the closer is the market outcome to the competitive equilibrium. In
addition, there was an interesting e®ect in terms of hydro scheduling: the more contracted is
the ¯rm, the more e±cient is the hydro scheduling, meaning that more water is allocated to
periods of high demand and less water to periods of low demand.
Firm 1's asset divestiture and contracting practices bring the market equilibrium closer to
the competitive equilibrium. However, requiring ¯rms to contract entails less intervention in
the industry structure and in the ¯rms' behavior. After vesting contracts expire (if this is the
case) ¯rms would be able to decide whom to contract with and at what price. Contracting
practices could even be useful to ful¯ll other objectives of the Chilean reform like transactions
between generating companies and distribution companies being more transparent and a
reduction of barriers to entry for new and small producers. Depending on the speci¯c features
of contracts (frequency, contracted quantity relative to total demand, etc.) they may increase
or reduce barriers to entry to the industry. Newbery (1997) argued that contracts in the UK
have been the mechanism for entering the industry with no risk. This has turned out to be an
e®ective disciplinary tool as customers may choose to sign long term contracts with an entrant
if the incumbent producers charge high prices. In the case of Chile it has been proposed to
require distribution companies to openly bid their contracts and to purchase contracts for
a quantity enough to satisfy their captive consumers' demand. The open bidding process
should take place 2 years ahead of consumption. In this way, new IPPs would be able to
participate in the bid and would have enough time to build a new plant. In order to further
reduce barriers of entry, it may be desirable to spread bids (in terms of volume traded) over a
period of time; in this way small producers would also be able to enter the industry. Finally,
unlike the divestiture of Firm 1 assets, that mainly a®ected Firm 1, requiring producers to
sell contracts in the transition period is probably more "fair" in terms of the impact that it
has over the two ¯rms, and thus will be probably easier to implement.
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether or not the contract market will develop. Risk averse
consumers willing to pay a premium over the expected spot price, strategic behavior by con-
sumers and the role of regulation in the development of the contract market were conceptually
analyzed. Regulation of the contract market, such as the imposition of vesting contracts may
be helpful in the transition period. However it is not desirable to rely exclusively on it, as
vesting contracts will necessarily expire at a certain time. When that happens producers and
consumers must face the right incentives in order to voluntarily contract. In addition, since
the contract and spot markets are interdependent, their regulations also are. One must be
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very careful of the e®ects of any regulation intended to develop or deepen the contract market
as this normative may, at the same time, introduce distortions or incentives to manipulate the
price in the spot market. It should be kept in mind that the ¯nal goal is not the development
of the contract market but a competitive spot market and so more importance must be given
to the regulation of the whole industry and the incentives producers and consumers have
to voluntarily contract: how are ¯nal prices determined, is there a price pass through, how
many agents are entitled to engage in voluntary contracting practices, is there a mandate to
supply power and so on. Clearly more quantitative research is needed on this subject.
Additional measures that may also be implemented to mitigate market power, like the
regulatory threat, the interconnection of the SIC system with the SING system and introduc-
ing demand side bidding were not analyzed here. Wolfram (1999) emphasized the importance
of the regulatory threat. The basic idea is that a regulatory authority with real power to
punish companies who exercise market power (or too much market power) provides enough
incentive for the ¯rms to behave competitively (or closer to it). The regulatory threat may
also be helpful to prevent producers from cooperating in the contract or in the spot market,
a desirable result as cooperation results in only partial (as opposed to full) hedging. Wol-
fram's argument is similar to Green (1999)'s regarding the role of contracting practices as a
commitment device. The interconnection of the SIC system with the SING system has been
proposed as a way to reduce the dependence the SIC has on its hydro-storage resources. In
addition, by increasing the number of ¯rms and the number of large consumers, competition
may also be enhanced. Finally, giving large consumers access to the spot market would in-
troduce demand side bidding. As a result, demand would be more price sensitive and the
exercise of market power would be more di±cult. This paperes result showed that the more
elastic is demand the closer is a welfare index to the competitive level. This calls for bigger
e®orts to increase the number of customers whose consumption decisions are a®ected by the
spot market price.
Before the regulatory authorities decide to deregulate the price and include some sort of
control mechanism to prevent market power abuses, there are two issues that I think should
be addressed. First of all, any market power mitigation measure that is introduced attempts
to control or in°uence the spot market's price. As more controls are introduced, the spot
market looks less like a real market and more like a centralized market subject to a di®erent
form of regulation. The point is then why bother in reforming the price system and move
towards a system where prices are market-set if at the end the authority wants to introduce
additional controls that prevent the price from being really market based? The authority
should introduce these control mechanisms not as a way to continue regulating the price but
to get the "market-based" price as close to the competitive price as possible. This leads to
a second point: if the current pricing system already sets the price at a level that is close
to the competitive level, is it really desirable moving forward to a system where prices are
completely market based, even though that entails the risk of market power abuses? In
order to answer this question, some previous questions should be addressed: is the current
regulatory system pricing at levels that are really close to the competitive equilibrium? If
yes, what additional bene¯ts would have to de-regulate prices? Some people mention that
the system would gain in transparency . Until now critics have come on qualitative grounds
but there are no quantitative estimations on how far or close current nodal price is from
the competitive price. In order to analyze the convenience of deregulating the system (and
implementing any of these measures), a careful welfare analysis of the current regulation
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must be done. It is clear that more quantitative work is needed before implementing a power
exchange system.
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Tables and Figures 
   
Table 1: Installed capacity in the SIC (December 2000), MW 
 
Economic 
Group 
Thermal Hydro-
ROR 
Hydro-
reservoir 
Hydro Total % 
thermal 
% hydro  % total 
Endesa (Firm 1) 939 238 2454 2693 3632 25.9% 74.1% 55% 
Gener   (Firm 2) 1212 245 0 245 1457 83.2% 16.8% 22% 
Colbun (Firm 3) 370 0 697 697 1067 34.7% 65.3% 16% 
Other 102 403 0 403 504 20.1% 79.9%  8% 
Total 2622 886 3151 4037 6660 39.0% 61.0% 100% 
Source: CDEC-SIC 
 
 
Table 2: Demand Estimation, April 2000, Elasticity = -1/3 
Demand 
level 
# hours Anchor 
quantity MW  
Anchor price 
US$/MW  
A B Elasticity at 
anchor point 
1 120 4749.7 31.1 6332.9 50.9 0.333 
2 120 4329.6 31.1 5912.8 50.9 0.366 
3 120 4091.1 31.1 5674.3 50.9 0.387 
4 120 3643.3 31.1 5226.5 50.9 0.435 
5 120 3270.8 31.1 4854.0 50.9 0.484 
6 120 2988.5 31.1 4571.7 50.9 0.530 
 
Table 3: Data to calculate residual demand (MW), Base Model 
Demand level Hydro peak 
shaving 
Thermal must run 
generation 
Hydro ROR Must run 
generation 
Total 
1 274.6 14.2 380.3 669.1 
2 183.8 14.2 380.3 578.2 
3 183.8 14.2 380.3 578.2 
4 183.8 14.2 380.3 578.2 
5 183.8 14.2 380.3 578.2 
6 183.8 14.2 380.3 578.2 
 
 
Table 4: Hydro Data used to estimate the Base Model 
 
Firm qhmin (MW) qhmax (MW) q~h (GWh month) 
Firm 1 743.7 2436.1 974.9 
Fringe 183.8 489.2 143.2 
 
Table 5: Base Model, Competitive results (E= -1/3) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe Qtot Price 
1 673.1 944.4 1617.5 2133.1 0.0 2133.1 3750.6 420.5 4839.0 29.4 
2 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1802.6 0.0 1802.6 3420.1 420.5 4418.9 29.4 
3 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1564.1 0.0 1564.1 3181.6 420.5 4180.4 29.4 
4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1116.3 0.0 1116.3 2733.8 420.5 3732.6 29.4 
5 673.1 944.4 1617.5 764.7 0.0 764.7 2382.2 420.1 3380.5 28.9 
6 566.2 944.4 1510.6 743.7 0.0 743.7 2254.4 416.6 3249.3 26.0 
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Table 6: Base Model, Competitive  results (E= -2/3) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe Qtot Price 
1 673.1 944.4 1617.5 2133.1 0.0 2133.1 3750.6 421.5 4840.0 30.2 
2 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1802.6 0.0 1802.6 3420.1 421.5 4419.9 30.2 
3 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1564.1 0.0 1564.1 3181.6 421.5 4181.4 30.2 
4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1116.3 0.0 1116.3 2733.8 421.5 3733.6 30.2 
5 673.1 944.4 1617.5 764.7 0.0 764.7 2382.2 421.3 3381.7 30.0 
6 673.1 944.4 1617.5 743.7 0.0 743.7 2361.2 418.4 3357.8 27.5 
 
Table 7: Base Model, Cournot Equilibrium (E=-1/3) 
t qth1 # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe Qtot Price 
1 133.7 944.4 1078.1 1743.0 0.0 1743.0 2821.3 441.2 3931.3 47.2 
2 140.1 944.4 1084.5 1572.0 0.0 1572.0 2656.5 437.5 3672.3 44.0 
3 120.3 944.4 1064.7 1472.6 0.0 1472.6 2537.3 434.9 3550.4 41.7 
4 122.0 944.4 1066.4 1247.0 0.0 1247.0 2313.4 429.9 3321.5 37.4 
5 127.0 867.7 994.7 1094.1 0.0 1094.1 2088.7 426.6 3093.6 34.6 
6 131.9 773.6 905.4 995.1 0.0 995.1 1900.6 424.5 2903.3 32.8 
# denotes Multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 different simulations 
 
Table 8: Base Model, Cournot Equilibrium (E=-2/3) 
t qth1# qth2 QRth qh1# qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe Qtot Price 
1 377.7 944.4 1322.1 1768.1 0.0 1768.1 3090.2 429.0 4188.3 36.6 
2 376.0 944.4 1320.4 1605.2 0.0 1605.2 2925.6 427.1 3930.9 35.0 
3 378.3 944.4 1322.7 1483.6 0.0 1483.6 2806.3 425.8 3810.3 33.9 
4 375.8 944.4 1320.2 1262.2 0.0 1262.2 2582.4 423.2 3583.9 31.7 
5 379.6 944.4 1324.0 1072.2 0.0 1072.2 2396.2 421.1 3395.6 29.9 
6 378.2 944.4 1322.5 932.5 0.0 932.5 2255.0 419.6 3252.8 28.5 
# denotes Multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 different simulations. 
 
Table 9: Lerner Indices, Base Model 
E = -1/3     E= -2/3 
T Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 
1 76% 38% 57% 25% 
2 75% 41% 55% 26% 
3 73% 43% 53% 27% 
4 70% 48% 50% 29% 
5 68% 48% 47% 31% 
6 66% 45% 45% 32% 
 
 
Table 10: Welfare Analysis  
Index (Perfect Competition = 100) 
 
Elasticity Firm 1’s 
Producer 
surplus 
Firm 2’s 
Producer 
surplus 
Fringe’s 
Producer 
surplus 
Producer 
surplus 
Consumer 
surplus 
Welfare 
E = -0.1 242.7 586.0 352.6 319.1 64.0 94.6 
E= -1/3 124.0 178.9 145.8 138.3 73.3 95.9 
E= -1/2 112.4 131.8 118.5 117.0 82.7 98.1 
E= -2/3 107.3 120.6 111.7 110.6 84.9 98.4 
E= -1.0 104.0 109.8 105.7 105.4 88.4 99.1 
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Table 11: Data to calculate residual demand (MW).  
Model with reduced hydro flows  
Demand level Hydro peak 
shaving 
Thermal must run 
generation 
Hydro ROR Must run 
generation 
Total 
1 119.3 14.2 228.2 361.7 
2 119.3 14.2 228.2 361.7 
3 119.3 14.2 228.2 361.7 
4 119.3 14.2 228.2 361.7 
5 119.3 14.2 228.2 361.7 
6 119.3 14.2 228.2 361.7 
 
Table 12: Competitive results with reduced hydro flows (E= -1/3) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe Qtot Price 
1 779.2 992.9 1772.1 833.4 0.0 833.4 2605.5 572.6 3420.4 57.6 
2 673.1 992.9 1666.0 808.2 0.0 808.2 2474.2 566.0 3282.6 51.9 
3 673.1 992.9 1666.0 808.2 0.0 808.2 2474.2 560.6 3277.2 47.2 
4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 551.5 3219.6 39.4 
5 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 543.3 3211.3 32.3 
6 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 537.0 3205.0 26.9 
 
Table 13: Cournot Equilibrium with reduced hydro flows (E=-1/3) 
t qth1# qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe Qtot Price 
1 614.3 944.4 1558.7 1029.6 0.0 1029.6 2588.3 453.2 3403.2 57.6 
2 607.0 944.4 1551.4 826.8 0.0 826.8 2378.2 448.6 3188.4 53.5 
3 527.4 944.4 1471.8 787.1 0.0 787.1 2258.9 445.9 3066.5 51.2 
4 454.6 944.4 1399.0 743.6 0.0 743.6 2142.6 438.5 2942.8 44.9 
5 426.4 944.4 1370.8 743.6 0.0 743.6 2114.4 430.9 2906.9 38.3 
6 341.7 902.7 1244.4 743.6 0.0 743.6 1988.0 427.4 2777.1 35.3 
# denotes multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 different simulations.  
 
Table 14: Welfare Analysis, Model with reduced hydro flows  
Index (Perfect Competition = 100) 
 
Elasticity Firm 1’s 
Producer 
surplus 
Firm 2’s 
Producer 
surplus 
Fringe’s 
Producer 
surplus 
Producer 
surplus 
Consumer 
surplus 
Welfare 
E = -0.1 123.4 147.9 144.6 135.3 77.7 96.7 
E= -1/3 107.6 115.4 109.7 110.0 87.1 98.7 
E= -1/2 103.7 107.4 103.1 104.4 92.2 99.3 
E= -2/3 102.5 105.3 101.4 102.8 93.3 99.4 
E= -1.0 101.4 103.2 99.9 101.4 94.5 99.4 
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Table 15: Demand Indicators  
 
 Total 
demand 
(GWh) 
Demand - qMR 
(GWh) * 
Inflows 
(GWh) 
Inflows    
(demand – qMR)  
Average Net 
demand per 
day (GWh) 
Max demand   
Min demand 
Average Elasticity 
Residual Ddand 
January 2733.43 2293.80 1058.98 46% 74.0 2.20 0.49 
February 2520.23 2139.77 996.86 47% 76.4 1.90 0.47 
March 2911.54 2532.46 1333.09 53% 81.7 1.85 0.51 
April 2768.74 2484.73 1118.05 45% 82.8 2.00 0.48 
May 2885.11 2587.79 1294.28 50% 83.5 1.69 0.45 
June 2794.75 2466.61 1561.06 63% 82.2 1.82 0.50 
July 2820.53 2487.82 1475.91 59% 80.3 1.79 0.49 
August 2799.88 2478.86 1384.18 56% 80.0 1.75 0.49 
September 2649.14 2307.95 1262.55 55% 76.9 1.94 0.48 
October 2770.69 2399.68 1478.88 62% 77.4 1.93 0.40 
November 2751.61 2328.93 1385.07 59% 77.6 1.90 0.40 
December 2859.66 2410.97 1279.78 53% 77.8 1.98 0.40 
* qMR includes production from must run thermal plants and hydro production from ROR plants. 
 
Table 16: Marginal Value of Water (MVW) 
 
 E = -0.1 E = -1/3 E= - 0.5 E = -2/3 E = -1.0 
January 0.00 11.13 11.13 13.91 17.90 
February 0.00 11.13 11.13 13.54 17.75 
March 0.00 10.62 11.13 13.36 17.75 
April 0.00 11.13 11.89 15.78 19.85 
May 0.00 9.53 11.13 12.78 17.29 
June 0.00 0.00 7.78 11.13 14.21 
July 0.00 1.92 10.08 11.13 15.41 
August 0.00 6.45 11.13 11.13 15.78 
September 0.00 8.47 11.13 11.98 17.03 
October 0.00 0.00 9.82 11.13 15.78 
November 0.00 2.21 11.13 11.13 17.01 
December 0.00 9.88 11.13 14.61 20.28 
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Table 17: Marginal Value of Water under different price elasticity assumptions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) 
Jan 11.13 10.08 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.49 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.0 0.03 0.0 46% 110% 46% 
Feb 11.13 9.33 17.75 17.25 0.47 0.47 1.36 1.36 0.08 0.0 0.23 0.0 47% 25% 47% 
Mar 10.62 8.88 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.51 0.15 0.15 0.08 0.0 0.03 0.0 53% 131% 53% 
Apr 11.13 11.13 15.78 15.45 0.48 0.48 0.94 0.94 0.10 0.0 0.19 0.0 45% 35% 45% 
May 9.53 7.85 9.53 7.85 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.06 0.0 0.06 0.0 50% 63% 50% 
Jun 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.09 0.0 0.09 0.0 63% 84% 63% 
Jul 1.92 1.14 1.92 1.14 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.08 0.0 0.08 0.0 59% 81% 59% 
Aug 6.45 5.32 11.13 11.13 0.49 0.49 0.73 0.73 0.09 0.0 0.13 0.0 56% 60% 56% 
Sep 8.47 7.02 11.98 11.13 0.48 0.48 0.92 0.92 0.09 0.0 0.16 0.0 55% 45% 55% 
Oct 0.00 0.00 11.13 11.13 0.40 0.40 0.72 0.72 0.06 0.0 0.11 0.0 62% 50% 62% 
Nov 2.21 1.08 17.01 16.62 0.40 0.40 1.00 1.00 0.06 0.0 0.12 0.0 59% 35% 59% 
Dec 9.88 7.90 14.61 14.02 0.40 0.40 0.72 0.72 0.06 0.0 0.09 0.0 53% 44% 53% 
Average 6.87 5.81 9.24 8.81 0.46 0.46 0.68 0.68 0.08 0.0 0.11 0.0    
stdev 4.55 4.16 6.93 6.83 0.04 0.04 0.35 0.35 0.02  0.06     
Corr MVW      0.24 0.27 0.88 0.89 0.26  0.77  -0.93  -0.22 
 
Table 18:  
Installed capacity in the SIC after full divestiture of Firm 1’s thermal plants (MW) 
Economic Group Thermal Hydro-reservoir Total 
Triopoly    
       Endesa (Firm 1) 0 2454 2454 
       Gener   (Firm 2) 1212 0 1212 
       Firm 3 939 0 939 
       Fringe 472 697 1169 
DLTF    
       Endesa (Firm 1) 0 2454 2454 
       Gener   (Firm 2) 1212 0 1212 
       Fringe 1411 697 2108 
Total 2622 3151 5773 
    Hydro-ROR not included in the table. 
 
Table 19: Divestiture of Firm 1’s thermal plants - Triopoly (E=-1/3) 
t 
qth1 qth2 qth3 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR 
QTh 
Fringe Qtot 
Price Ex-Firm 1’s 
thermal 
1 0.0 944.4 673.1 1617.5 1620.8 0.0 1620.8 3238.3 431.9 4339.3 39.2 673.1 
2 0.0 944.4 572.2 1516.6 1506.6 0.0 1506.6 3023.2 429.4 4030.8 37.0 572.2 
3 0.0 920.5 500.7 1421.2 1435.1 0.0 1435.1 2856.3 427.8 3862.3 35.6 500.7 
4 0.0 786.6 454.6 1241.2 1301.2 0.0 1301.2 2542.4 424.8 3545.4 33.0 454.6 
5 0.0 662.4 454.6 1117.0 1177.0 0.0 1177.0 2294.0 422.0 3294.3 30.6 454.6 
6 0.0 568.3 454.6 1022.9 1083.0 0.0 1083.0 2105.8 419.9 3104.0 28.8 454.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 MVW Average Elasticity of 
residual demand 
St dev intra-month 
elasticity 
Inflows/ net demand 
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Table 20: Divestiture of Firm 1’s thermal plants - DLTF (E=-1/3) 
t 
qth1 qth2 qth3 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR 
QTh 
Fringe Qtot 
Price Ex-Firm 1’s 
thermal 
1 0.0 944.4 na 944.4 1712.0 0.0 1712.0 2656.4 1026.3 4351.7 38.9 673.1 
2 0.0 944.4 na 944.4 1547.3 0.0 1547.3 2491.7 998.5 4068.5 36.2 673.1 
3 0.0 944.4 na 944.4 1428.1 0.0 1428.1 2372.5 978.4 3929.1 34.3 673.1 
4 0.0 833.5 na 833.5 1259.6 0.0 1259.6 2093.1 950.0 3621.4 31.5 673.1 
5 0.0 709.3 na 709.3 1135.5 0.0 1135.5 1844.8 929.1 3352.1 29.5 673.1 
6 0.0 615.2 na 615.2 1041.4 0.0 1041.4 1656.6 913.3 3148.1 28.0 673.1 
 
Table 21 
Effect of Firm 1’s thermal plants divestiture on total profits (E=-1/3) 
Index (Base Model = 100) 
Model Firm 1 Firm 2  Firm 1+ Firm 3/Fringe  
Base 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Triopoly 79.7 70.8 97.8 
DLTF 77.8 68.9 96.6 
Perfect Competition 80.7 55.9 80.7 
 
Table 22 
Installed capacity in the SIC after divestiture of Firm 1’s hydro plants (MW) 
Economic Group Thermal Hydro-reservoir Total 
DLHF Model    
    Firm 1 939 0 939 
    Firm 2 1212 0 1212 
    Fringe 472 3151 3623 
DMHF Model    
    Firm 1 939 1754 2693 
    Firm 2 1212 0 1212 
    Fringe 472 1397 1869 
Total 2622 3151 5774 
         Hydro-ROR not included in the table. 
 
Table 23: Hydro production according to Peak shaving (MW)  
Demand level Base Model DLHF DMHF 
1 274.6 2406.5 1296.8 
2 183.8 1986.4 1296.8 
3 183.8 1747.9 1215.8 
4 183.8 1300.1 785.9 
5 183.8 948.5 419.6 
6 183.8 927.5 379.2 
 
Table 24: Full divestiture of hydro – storage plants, DLHF model. (E=-1/3) 
t 
qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR 
Qth 
fringe Qtot Price 
1 457.7 877.5 1335.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1335.2 426.8 4562.9 34.8 
2 457.7 877.5 1335.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1335.2 426.8 4142.8 34.8 
3 457.7 877.5 1335.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1335.2 426.8 3904.3 34.8 
4 457.7 877.5 1335.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1335.2 426.8 3456.5 34.8 
5 454.6 868.6 1323.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1323.2 426.6 3092.7 34.6 
6 454.6 737.9 1192.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1192.5 423.7 2938.2 32.1 
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Table 25: Lerner Indices 
        Base  model                       DMHF Model                       DLHF model 
t Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 
1 76.4% 38.4% 60.2% 45.7% 25.3% 48.5% 
2 74.7% 41.2% 55.9% 49.9% 25.3% 48.5% 
3 73.3% 43.5% 54.6% 48.5% 25.3% 48.5% 
4 70.3% 48.5% 54.5% 48.3% 25.3% 48.5% 
5 67.8% 48.2% 54.4% 48.3% 25.2% 48.2% 
6 66.0% 45.3% 52.3% 45.8% 27.2% 44.2% 
 
Table 26  
Effect of Firm 1’s hydro plants divestiture on total profits (E=-1/3) 
Index (Base Model = 100) 
Model Firm 1 Firm 2 Fringe Firm 1 adjusted * 
Base 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
DLHF 17.1 73.3 215.1 96.7 
DMHF 54.9 80.1 158.6 98.0 
Perfect Competition 80.7 55.9 68.6 80.7 
* Firm 1’s profits + Profits the fringe gets from former Firm 1’s hydro plants. 
 
 
Table 27: Partial Divestiture of hydro plants: DMHF model (E=-1/3) 
t qth1# qth2 QRth qh1 #  qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe Qtot Price 
1 385.7 944.4 1330.1 859.0 0 859.0 2189.1 432.5 4312.8 39.7 
2 380.2 930.3 1310.5 661.5 0 661.5 1972.0 428.0 4091.2 35.8 
3 369.5 877.8 1247.3 619.7 0 619.7 1867.0 426.8 3904.0 34.8 
4 371.1 871.8 1242.9 612.1 0 612.1 1855.0 426.7 3462.1 34.7 
5 367.7 869.7 1237.5 613.5 0 613.5 1850.9 426.7 3091.6 34.6 
6 343.8 789.1 1132.9 556.7 0 556.7 1689.6 424.9 2888.1 33.1 
# denotes Multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 different simulations 
 
Table 28: Welfare analysis  
(Index, Base Case = 100) 
Model Firm 1* Firm 2 Fringe ** Producer 
Surplus 
Consumer 
Surplus  
Welfare  
Base 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Triopoly 79.7 (97.8) 70.8 113.8 (84.0) 88.5 117.7 103.0 
DLTF 77.8 (96.6) 68.9 108.1 (77.4) 85.5 120.7 103.0 
DLHF 17.1 (96.7) 73.3 215.1 (84.5) 88.5 118.1 103.3 
DMHF 54.9 (98.0) 80.1 158.6 (87.9) 91.5 114.0 102.7 
Perf. Competition 100.0 55.9 68.6 72.3 136.5 104.3 
*In parenthesis Firm 1’s profits + profits from former Firm 1’s plants. ** In parenthesis profits earned by 
the former fringe (i.e. without including former Firm 1’s plants)  
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Table 29:  Cournot Equilibrium, Contracting level = 0%  (E=-1/3) 
t K1 K2 qth1# qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe Qtot Price 
1 0 0 133.7 944.4 1078.1 1743.0 0.0 1743.0 2821.3 441.2 3931.3 47.2 
2 0 0 140.1 944.4 1084.5 1572.0 0.0 1572.0 2656.5 437.5 3672.3 44.0 
3 0 0 120.3 944.4 1064.7 1472.6 0.0 1472.6 2537.3 434.9 3550.4 41.7 
4 0 0 122.0 944.4 1066.4 1247.0 0.0 1247.0 2313.4 429.9 3321.5 37.4 
5 0 0 127.0 867.7 994.7 1094.1 0.0 1094.1 2088.7 426.6 3093.6 34.6 
6 0 0 131.9 773.6 905.4 995.1 0.0 995.1 1900.6 424.5 2903.3 32.8 
# denotes Multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 different simulations 
 
Table 30: Cournot Equilibrium, Contracting level =50%  (E=-1/3) 
t K1 K2 qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe Qtot Price 
1 1403.1 472.2 454.6 944.4 1399.0 1967.6 0.0 1967.6 3366.5 429.1 4464.4 36.7 
2 1237.8 472.2 454.6 944.4 1399.0 1720.1 0.0 1720.1 3119.1 427.2 4124.6 35.1 
3 1118.6 472.2 454.6 944.4 1399.0 1541.3 0.0 1541.3 2940.2 425.9 3944.4 34.0 
4 894.7 472.2 454.6 944.4 1399.0 1205.4 0.0 1205.4 2604.4 423.4 3606.1 31.8 
5 718.9 472.2 454.6 944.4 1399.0 931.3 0.0 931.3 2330.2 421.2 3329.7 29.9 
6 655.0 472.2 454.6 944.4 1399.0 758.2 0.0 758.2 2157.1 418.8 3154.2 27.8 
 
Table 31: Cournot Equilibrium, Contracting level =100%  (E=-1/3) 
t K1 K2 qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe Qtot Price 
1 2806.2 944.4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 2134.7 0.0 2134.7 3752.2 420.5 4841.4 29.3 
2 2475.7 944.4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1804.6 0.0 1804.6 3422.1 420.5 4420.9 29.3 
3 2237.2 944.4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1566.2 0.0 1566.2 3183.6 420.5 4182.4 29.3 
4 1789.4 944.4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1118.4 0.0 1118.4 2735.8 420.5 3734.6 29.3 
5 1437.8 944.4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 756.3 0.0 756.3 2373.8 420.3 3372.3 29.1 
6 1310.0 944.4 566.4 944.4 1510.8 743.6 0.0 743.6 2254.4 416.6 3249.2 26.0 
 
Table 32: Marginal Value of water (? ??  
                                                        Contracting Level   
T 0% 50% 100% 
1 11.13 17.13 29.27 
2 11.13 17.13 29.27 
3 11.13 17.13 29.27 
4 11.13 17.13 29.27 
5 11.13 17.13 29.27 
6 11.13 17.13 25.98 
 
Table 33: Lerner Indices  
  Contracting = 0%  Contracting = 50% Contracting = 100%  
t Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 
1 76.4% 38.4% 53.3% 24.7% 0% 0% 
2 74.7% 41.2% 51.2% 25.8% 0% 0% 
3 73.3% 43.5% 49.6% 26.7% 0% 0% 
4 70.3% 48.5% 46.2% 28.5% 0% 0% 
5 67.8% 48.2% 42.8% 30.3% -1% 0% 
6 66.0% 45.3% 38.5% 32.6% 0% 0% 
 
 
 54 
Figures 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Marginal Cost Functions 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
Adjusted capacity, MW
U
S
$/
M
W
Firm 1Fringe Firm 2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marginal Cost Functions
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Adjusted Capacity, MW
U
S
$ 
/ M
W
Firm 1
Firm 2
Firm 3
 55 
Figure  3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Load per hour (April 2000)
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
1 101 201 301 401 501 601 701
Hour
M
W
Anchor price/quantity
10
15
20
25
30
35
2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Output (MW)
pr
ic
e
t=1
t=2
t=3
t=4
t=5
t=6
 56 
Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fringe's MC if 2 strategic producers
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0 100 200 300 400 500
Capacity, MW
$/
M
W
Peak shaving results (April 2000)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
1 40 79 11
8
15
7
19
6
23
5
27
4
31
3
35
2
39
1
43
0
46
9
50
8
54
7
58
6
62
5
66
4
70
3
Ranking (hour)
M
W
Load curve
Shaved demand
Hydro generation
 57 
Figure 7 
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Figure 21 
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Figure 27 
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APPENDIX 1  
1. Base Model, Same slope approach 
A. Competitive Equilibrium (Same slope approach) 
Table A1.1: Competitive equilibrium (E=-0.1) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 665.94 944.40 1610.34 2133.1 0 2133.1 3743.4 690.03 394.46 2406.49 4827.9 26.0 
2 665.94 944.40 1610.34 1802.6 0 1802.6 3412.9 600.43 394.46 1986.36 4407.8 26.0 
3 665.94 944.40 1610.34 1564.1 0 1564.1 3174.4 600.43 394.46 1747.87 4169.3 26.0 
4 665.94 944.40 1610.34 1116.3 0 1116.3 2726.6 600.43 394.46 1300.08 3721.5 26.0 
5 645.03 944.40 1589.43 764.7 0 764.7 2354.1 600.43 394.46 948.48 3349.0 26.0 
6 454.60 944.40 1399.00 743.7 0 743.7 2142.7 595.43 394.46 927.52 3132.6 21.7 
 
Table A1.2: Competitive equilibrium (E=-1/3) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 673.1 944.4 1617.5 2133.1 0.0 2133.1 3750.6 693.9 394.46 2406.49 4839.0 29.4
2 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1802.6 0.0 1802.6 3420.1 604.3 394.46 1986.36 4418.9 29.4
3 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1564.1 0.0 1564.1 3181.6 604.3 394.46 1747.87 4180.4 29.4
4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1116.3 0.0 1116.3 2733.8 604.3 394.46 1300.08 3732.6 29.4
5 673.1 944.4 1617.5 764.7 0.0 764.7 2382.2 603.9 394.46 948.48 3380.5 28.9
6 566.2 944.4 1510.6 743.7 0.0 743.7 2254.4 600.4 394.46 927.52 3249.3 26.0
 
Table A1.3: Competitive equilibrium (E=-0.5) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 673.10 944.40 1617.50 2133.1 0 2133.1 3750.6 694.61 394.46 2406.49 4839.7 29.9 
2 673.10 944.40 1617.50 1802.6 1 1803.6 3421.1 605.01 394.46 1986.36 4420.5 29.9 
3 673.10 944.40 1617.50 1564.1 2 1566.1 3183.6 605.01 394.46 1747.87 4183.0 29.9 
4 673.10 944.40 1617.50 1116.3 3 1119.3 2736.8 605.01 394.46 1300.08 3736.2 29.9 
5 673.10 944.40 1617.50 764.7 4 768.7 2386.2 604.69 394.46 948.48 3385.3 29.7 
6 673.10 944.40 1617.50 743.7 5 748.7 2366.2 600.79 394.46 927.52 3361.5 26.3 
 
Table A1.4: Competitive equilibrium (E=-2/3) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 673.1 944.4 1617.5 2133.1 0.0 2133.1 3750.6 694.9 394.46 2406.49 4840.0 30.2
2 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1802.6 0.0 1802.6 3420.1 605.3 394.46 1986.36 4419.9 30.2
3 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1564.1 0.0 1564.1 3181.6 605.3 394.46 1747.87 4181.4 30.2
4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1116.3 0.0 1116.3 2733.8 605.3 394.46 1300.08 3733.6 30.2
5 673.1 944.4 1617.5 764.7 0.0 764.7 2382.2 605.1 394.46 948.48 3381.7 30.0
6 673.1 944.4 1617.5 743.7 0.0 743.7 2361.2 602.2 394.46 927.52 3357.8 27.5
 
Table A1.5: Competitive equilibrium (E=-1.0) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 673.10 944.40 1617.50 2133.1 0 2133.1 3750.6 695.28 394.46 2406.49 4840.3 30.5 
2 673.10 944.40 1617.50 1802.6 0 1802.6 3420.1 605.68 394.46 1986.36 4420.2 30.5 
3 673.10 944.40 1617.50 1564.1 0 1564.1 3181.6 605.68 394.46 1747.87 4181.7 30.5 
4 673.10 944.40 1617.50 1116.3 0 1116.3 2733.8 605.68 394.46 1300.08 3733.9 30.5 
5 673.10 944.40 1617.50 764.7 0 764.7 2382.2 605.53 394.46 948.48 3382.2 30.4 
6 673.10 944.40 1617.50 743.7 0 743.7 2361.2 603.56 394.46 927.52 3359.2 28.7 
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B. Cournot equilibrium (Same slope approach) 
Table A1.6: Cournot equilibrium (E=-0.1) 
t qth1 # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 0.0 944.4 944.4 1612.3 0.0 1612.3 2556.7 500.3 394.46 274.6 3726.1 98.1 
2 0.0 944.4 944.4 1447.7 0.0 1447.7 2392.1 488.6 394.46 183.8 3459.0 88.1 
3 0.0 944.4 944.4 1328.4 0.0 1328.4 2272.8 480.2 394.46 183.8 3331.3 80.9 
4 0.0 854.9 854.9 1149.3 0.0 1149.3 2004.2 467.6 394.46 183.8 3050.0 70.0 
5 0.0 730.7 730.7 1025.1 0.0 1025.1 1755.9 458.8 394.46 183.8 2792.9 62.4 
6 0.0 636.6 636.6 931.0 0.0 931.0 1567.7 452.2 394.46 183.8 2598.1 56.7 
# denotes multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
 
Table A1.7: Cournot equilibrium (E=-1/3) 
t qth1 # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 133.7 944.4 1078.1 1743.0 0.0 1743.0 2821.1 441.2 394.46 274.6 3931.4 47.2
2 140.1 944.4 1084.5 1572.0 0.0 1572.0 2656.5 437.5 394.46 183.8 3672.3 44.0
3 120.3 944.4 1064.7 1472.6 0.0 1472.6 2537.3 434.9 394.46 183.8 3550.4 41.7
4 122.0 944.4 1066.4 1247.0 0.0 1247.0 2313.4 429.9 394.46 183.8 3321.5 37.4
5 127.0 867.7 994.7 1094.1 0.0 1094.1 2088.8 426.6 394.46 183.8 3093.6 34.6
6 131.9 773.6 905.4 995.1 0.0 995.1 1900.6 424.5 394.46 183.8 2903.3 32.8
# denotes multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
 
Table A1.8: Cournot equilibrium (E=-0.5) 
t qth1 # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 341.7 944.4 1286.1 1759.9 0.0 1759.9 3046.0 431.7 394.46 274.6 4146.8 39.0 
2 341.7 944.4 1286.1 1595.3 0.0 1595.3 2881.4 429.3 394.46 183.8 3888.9 36.9 
3 341.7 944.4 1286.1 1476.0 0.0 1476.0 2762.1 427.5 394.46 183.8 3767.8 35.3 
4 341.7 944.4 1286.1 1252.1 0.0 1252.1 2538.2 424.1 394.46 183.8 3540.6 32.4 
5 341.7 941.5 1283.2 1067.3 0.0 1067.3 2350.5 421.4 394.46 183.8 3350.1 30.1 
6 341.7 847.4 1189.1 973.2 0.0 973.2 2162.3 420.0 394.46 183.8 3160.5 28.9 
# denotes multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
Table A1.9:Cournot equilibrium (E=-2/3) 
t qth1 # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 377.7 944.4 1322.1 1768.1 0.0 1768.1 3090.2 429.0 394.46 274.6 4188.3 36.6
2 376.0 944.4 1320.4 1605.2 0.0 1605.2 2925.6 427.1 394.46 183.8 3930.9 35.0
3 378.3 944.4 1322.7 1483.6 0.0 1483.6 2806.3 425.8 394.46 183.8 3810.3 33.9
4 375.8 944.4 1320.2 1262.2 0.0 1262.2 2582.4 423.2 394.46 183.8 3583.9 31.7
5 379.6 944.4 1324.0 1072.2 0.0 1072.2 2396.2 421.1 394.46 183.8 3395.6 29.9
6 378.2 944.4 1322.5 932.5 0.0 932.5 2255.0 419.6 394.46 183.8 3252.8 28.5
# denotes mu ltiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
 
Table A1.10: Cournot equilibrium (E=-1.0) 
t qth1# qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 454.6 944.4 1399.0 1768.2 0.0 1768.2 3167.2 426.3 394.46 274.6 4262.5 34.3 
2 454.6 944.4 1399.0 1603.6 0.0 1603.6 3002.6 425.0 394.46 183.8 4005.8 33.2 
3 454.6 944.4 1399.0 1484.3 0.0 1484.3 2883.3 424.1 394.46 183.8 3885.7 32.4 
4 454.6 944.4 1399.0 1260.4 0.0 1260.4 2659.4 422.4 394.46 183.8 3660.1 31.0 
5 454.6 944.4 1399.0 1074.2 0.0 1074.2 2473.2 421.0 394.46 183.8 3472.4 29.8 
6 454.6 944.4 1399.0 933.0 0.0 933.0 2332.0 420.0 394.46 183.8 3330.2 28.9 
# denotes multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
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Table A1.11: Lerner Indices 
    E=-0.1         E=-1/3  E=0.5  E= -2/3       E=-1.0 
t Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 
1 100% 59% 76% 38% 70% 31% 57% 25% 42% 18% 
2 100% 65% 75% 41% 68% 33% 55% 26% 40% 18% 
3 100% 71% 73% 43% 66% 34% 53% 27% 39% 19% 
4 100% 74% 70% 48% 63% 38% 50% 29% 36% 20% 
5 100% 71% 68% 48% 60% 40% 47% 31% 33% 21% 
6 100% 68% 66% 45% 59% 38% 45% 32% 31% 21% 
 
2. Base Model, Different slope approach 
A. Competitive Equilibrium (Different slope approach) 
Table A1.12: Competitive equilibrium (E=-0.1) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 665.94 944.40 1610.34 2133.1 0 2133.1 3743.4 690.0 394.46 2406.49 4827.9 25.98
2 659.02 944.40 1603.42 1802.6 0 1802.6 3406.0 600.4 394.46 1986.36 4400.9 25.98
3 655.09 944.40 1599.49 1564.1 0 1564.1 3163.6 600.4 394.46 1747.87 4158.5 25.98
4 647.72 944.40 1592.12 1116.3 0 1116.3 2708.4 600.4 394.46 1300.08 3703.3 25.98
5 620.67 944.40 1565.07 764.7 0 764.7 2329.7 600.4 394.46 948.48 3324.6 25.98
6 454.60 931.31 1385.91 743.7 0 743.7 2129.6 591.1 394.46 927.52 3115.2 17.92
 
Table A1.13: Competitive equilibrium (E=-1/3) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 673.1 944.4 1617.5 2133.1 0 2133.1 3750.6 693.9 394.46 2406.49 4839.0 29.4
2 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1802.6 0 1802.6 3420.1 604.1 394.46 1986.36 4418.7 29.2
3 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1564.1 0 1564.1 3181.6 604.0 394.46 1747.87 4180.0 29.1
4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1116.3 0 1116.3 2733.8 603.7 394.46 1300.08 3732.0 28.8
5 673.1 944.4 1617.5 764.7 0 764.7 2382.2 602.8 394.46 948.48 3379.4 28.0
6 469.5 944.4 1413.9 743.7 0 743.7 2157.7 600.4 394.46 927.52 3152.6 26.0
 
Table A1.14: Competitive equilibrium (E=-0.5) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 673.10 944.40 1617.50 2133.1 0 2133.1 3750.6 694.6 394.46 2406.49 4839.7 29.93 
2 673.10 944.40 1617.50 1802.6 0 1802.6 3420.1 604.9 394.46 1986.36 4419.4 29.81 
3 673.10 944.40 1617.50 1564.1 0 1564.1 3181.6 604.8 394.46 1747.87 4180.8 29.74 
4 673.10 944.40 1617.50 1116.3 0 1116.3 2733.8 604.6 394.46 1300.08 3732.8 29.58 
5 673.10 944.40 1617.50 764.7 0 764.7 2382.2 604.0 394.46 948.48 3380.6 29.02 
6 551.59 944.40 1495.99 743.7 0 743.7 2239.7 600.4 394.46 927.52 3234.6 25.98 
 
Table A1.15: Competitive equilibrium (E=-2/3) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 673.1 944.4 1617.5 2133.1 0.0 2133.1 3750.6 694.9 394.46 2406.49 4840.0 30.2
2 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1802.6 0.0 1802.6 3420.1 605.2 394.46 1986.36 4419.8 30.1
3 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1564.1 0.0 1564.1 3181.6 605.2 394.46 1747.87 4181.2 30.1
4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1116.3 0.0 1116.3 2733.8 605.0 394.46 1300.08 3733.3 30.0
5 673.1 944.4 1617.5 764.7 0.0 764.7 2382.2 604.5 394.46 948.48 3381.2 29.5
6 633.6 944.4 1578.0 743.7 0.0 743.7 2321.7 600.4 394.46 927.52 3316.6 26.0
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Table A1.16: Competitive equilibrium (E=-1.0) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 673.10 944.40 1617.50 2133.1 0 2133.1 3750.6 695.3 394.46 2406.49 4840.3 30.51 
2 673.10 944.40 1617.50 1802.6 0 1802.6 3420.1 605.6 394.46 1986.36 4420.1 30.45 
3 673.10 944.40 1617.50 1564.1 0 1564.1 3181.6 605.6 394.46 1747.87 4181.6 30.42 
4 673.10 944.40 1617.50 1116.3 0 1116.3 2733.8 605.5 394.46 1300.08 3733.7 30.33 
5 673.10 944.40 1617.50 764.7 0 764.7 2382.2 605.1 394.46 948.48 3381.8 30.05 
6 673.10 944.40 1617.50 743.7 0 743.7 2361.2 601.9 394.46 927.52 3357.6 27.26 
 
B. Cournot equilibrium (Different slope approach) 
Table A1.17: Cournot equilibrium (E=-0.1) 
t qth1  # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 0.0 944.4 944.4 1612.3 0.0 1612.3 2556.7 500.1 394.46 274.6 3725.9 98.0 
2 0.0 944.4 944.4 1426.7 0.0 1426.7 2371.1 496.3 394.46 183.8 3445.6 94.7 
3 0.0 944.4 944.4 1295.5 0.0 1295.5 2239.9 491.1 394.46 183.8 3309.2 90.2 
4 0.0 860.7 860.7 1091.1 0.0 1091.1 1951.8 484.9 394.46 183.8 3014.9 84.9 
5 0.0 738.4 738.4 947.3 0.0 947.3 1685.8 480.7 394.46 183.8 2744.7 81.3 
6 0.0 645.7 645.7 838.4 0.0 838.4 1484.1 476.8 394.46 183.8 2539.2 77.9 
# denotes multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
 
Table A1.18: Cournot equilibrium (E=-1/3) 
t qth1 # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 61.2 944.4 1005.6 1815.6 0.0 1815.6 2821.2 441.2 394.46 274.6 3931.5 47.2
2 59.0 944.4 1003.4 1608.1 0.0 1608.1 2611.5 440.0 394.46 183.8 3629.8 46.2
3 49.7 944.4 994.0 1472.7 0.0 1472.7 2466.8 438.6 394.46 183.8 3483.6 45.0
4 31.4 944.4 975.7 1219.2 0.0 1219.2 2194.9 435.5 394.46 183.8 3208.6 42.2
5 21.1 833.9 855.0 1058.6 0.0 1058.6 1913.6 434.0 394.46 183.8 2925.8 40.9
6 9.0 733.3 742.3 949.6 0.0 949.6 1691.9 432.9 394.46 183.8 2703.1 40.0
# denotes multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
 
Table A1.19: Cournot equilibrium (E=-0.5) 
t qth1 # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 248.6 944.4 1193.0 1882.4 0.0 1882.4 3075.4 431.3 394.46 274.6 4175.7 38.6 
2 241.2 944.4 1185.6 1657.7 0.0 1657.7 2843.2 430.5 394.46 183.8 3852.0 38.0 
3 242.8 944.4 1187.2 1498.5 0.0 1498.5 2685.7 429.6 394.46 183.8 3693.5 37.1 
4 232.2 944.4 1176.6 1213.3 0.0 1213.3 2389.9 427.5 394.46 183.8 3395.6 35.3 
5 259.0 871.2 1130.2 977.1 0.0 977.1 2107.3 426.1 394.46 183.8 3111.6 34.1 
6 206.6 767.5 974.1 894.8 0.0 894.8 1868.9 425.4 394.46 183.8 2872.5 33.5 
# denotes multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
 
Table A1.20: Cournot equilibrium (E=-2/3) 
t qth1 # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 341.7 944.4 1286.1 1933.0 0.0 1933.0 3219.1 427.5 394.46 274.6 4315.7 35.4
2 341.7 944.4 1286.1 1688.1 0.0 1688.1 2974.2 426.9 394.46 183.8 3979.3 34.9
3 341.7 944.4 1286.1 1523.2 0.0 1523.2 2809.3 426.2 394.46 183.8 3813.8 34.3
4 341.7 944.4 1286.1 1213.8 0.0 1213.8 2499.9 424.7 394.46 183.8 3502.8 32.9
5 341.7 944.4 1286.1 956.4 0.0 956.4 2242.5 423.0 394.46 183.8 3243.7 31.5
6 341.7 848.2 1190.0 809.3 0.0 809.3 1999.3 422.4 394.46 183.8 2999.9 30.9
# denotes multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
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Table A1.21: Cournot equilibrium (E=-1.0) 
t qth1 # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 454.6 944.4 1399.0 1969.6 0.0 1969.6 3368.5 424.8 394.46 274.6 4462.4 33.0 
2 454.6 944.4 1399.0 1711.2 0.0 1711.2 3110.2 424.4 394.46 183.8 4112.8 32.7 
3 454.6 944.4 1399.0 1538.8 0.0 1538.8 2937.7 423.9 394.46 183.8 3939.9 32.3 
4 454.6 944.4 1399.0 1215.0 0.0 1215.0 2614.0 422.8 394.46 183.8 3615.1 31.3 
5 454.6 944.4 1399.0 945.7 0.0 945.7 2344.6 421.8 394.46 183.8 3344.6 30.4 
6 454.6 944.4 1399.0 743.6 0.0 743.6 2142.6 420.7 394.46 183.8 3141.5 29.5 
# denotes  multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
 
Table A1.22: Lerner Indices 
    E=-0.1         E=-1/3  E=0.5  E= -2/3       E=-1.0 
t Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 
1 100% 59% 76% 38% 71% 32% 62% 26% 48% 19% 
2 100% 66% 76% 43% 71% 35% 62% 29% 47% 21% 
3 100% 73% 75% 47% 70% 38% 61% 31% 47% 22% 
4 100% 79% 74% 56% 69% 45% 60% 36% 45% 25% 
5 100% 78% 73% 56% 67% 48% 58% 42% 43% 29% 
6 100% 77% 72% 55% 67% 47% 57% 42% 42% 33% 
 
3. Base Model, Same slope approach, Reduced Hydro Flows  
A. Competitive Equilibrium (Same slope approach) 
Table A1.23: Competitive equilibrium (E=-0.1) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 860.0 1101.3 1961.3 833.4 0.0 833.4 2794.7 629.9 242.4 952.7 3666.9 107.0 
2 779.2 1101.3 1880.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2688.7 606.1 242.4 927.5 3537.1 86.5 
3 779.2 992.9 1772.1 808.2 0.0 808.2 2580.3 596.2 242.4 927.5 3418.9 78.0 
4 705.2 992.9 1698.1 808.2 0.0 808.2 2506.3 566.8 242.4 927.5 3315.4 52.6 
5 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 546.2 242.4 927.5 3214.3 34.8 
6 535.8 944.4 1480.2 808.2 0.0 808.2 2288.4 536.0 242.4 927.5 3066.7 26.0 
 
Table A1.24: Competitive equilibrium (E=-1/3) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 779.2 992.9 1772.1 833.4 0.0 833.4 2605.5 572.6 242.4 952.7 3420.4 57.6
2 673.1 992.9 1666.0 808.2 0.0 808.2 2474.2 566.0 242.4 927.5 3282.6 51.9
3 673.1 992.9 1666.0 808.2 0.0 808.2 2474.2 560.6 242.4 927.5 3277.2 47.2
4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 551.5 242.4 927.5 3219.6 39.4
5 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 543.3 242.4 927.5 3211.3 32.3
6 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 537.0 242.4 927.5 3205.0 26.9
Table A1.25: Competitive equilibrium (E=-0.5) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 673.1 992.9 1666.0 833.4 0.0 833.4 2499.4 564.0 242.4 952.7 3305.7 50.2 
2 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 558.7 242.4 927.5 3226.8 45.6 
3 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 555.1 242.4 927.5 3223.2 42.5 
4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 548.4 242.4 927.5 3216.4 36.7 
5 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 542.8 242.4 927.5 3210.9 31.9 
6 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 538.6 242.4 927.5 3206.6 28.2 
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Table A1.26: Competitive equilibrium (E=-2/3) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 673.1 944.4 1617.5 833.4 0.0 833.4 2450.9 559.0 242.4 952.7 3252.3 45.9
2 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 554.5 242.4 927.5 3222.6 42.0
3 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 551.8 242.4 927.5 3219.9 39.7
4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 546.8 242.4 927.5 3214.8 35.3
5 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 542.6 242.4 927.5 3210.6 31.7
6 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 539.4 242.4 927.5 3207.5 29.0
 
Table A1.27: Competitive equilibrium (E=-1.0) 
t qth1 qth2 QRth qh1 qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 673.1 944.4 1617.5 833.4 0.0 833.4 2450.9 553.3 242.4 952.7 3246.5 40.9 
2 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 550.3 242.4 927.5 3218.4 38.4 
3 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 548.5 242.4 927.5 3216.6 36.8 
4 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 545.2 242.4 927.5 3213.2 33.9 
5 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 542.4 242.4 927.5 3210.4 31.5 
6 673.1 944.4 1617.5 808.2 0.0 808.2 2425.7 540.2 242.4 927.5 3208.3 29.7 
 
B. Cournot equilibrium, Same slope approach, Reduced Hydro Flows  
Table A1.28: Cournot equilibrium (E=-0.1) 
t qth1 # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 486.8 992.9 1479.8 1041.5 0.0 1041.5 2521.2 524.4 242.4 119.3 3407.4 119.0 
2 488.9 983.0 1472.0 834.2 0.0 834.2 2306.2 510.0 242.4 119.3 3177.9 106.5 
3 455.6 944.4 1399.9 767.8 0.0 767.8 2167.7 502.9 242.4 119.3 3032.3 100.4 
4 341.7 944.4 1286.1 743.6 0.0 743.6 2029.7 481.1 242.4 119.3 2872.5 81.6 
5 231.8 863.9 1095.7 743.6 0.0 743.6 1839.3 468.2 242.4 119.3 2669.2 70.5 
6 137.7 769.8 907.5 743.6 0.0 743.6 1651.1 461.6 242.4 119.3 2474.4 64.8 
# denotes multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
 
Table A1.29: Cournot equilibrium (E=-1/3) 
t qth1 # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 614.3 944.4 1558.7 1029.6 0.0 1029.6 2588.3 453.2 242.4 119.3 3403.2 57.6
2 607.0 944.4 1551.4 826.8 0.0 826.8 2378.2 448.6 242.4 119.3 3188.4 53.5
3 527.4 944.4 1471.8 787.1 0.0 787.1 2258.9 445.9 242.4 119.3 3066.5 51.2
4 454.6 944.4 1399.0 743.6 0.0 743.6 2142.6 438.5 242.4 119.3 2942.8 44.9
5 426.4 944.4 1370.8 743.6 0.0 743.6 2114.4 430.9 242.4 119.3 2906.9 38.3
6 341.7 902.7 1244.4 743.6 0.0 743.6 1988.0 427.4 242.4 119.3 2777.1 35.3
# denotes multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
 
Table A1.30: Cournot equilibrium (E=-0.5) 
t qth1 # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 662.7 944.4 1607.1 1046.3 0.0 1046.3 2653.4 442.2 242.4 119.3 3457.3 48.0 
2 662.7 944.4 1607.1 836.3 0.0 836.3 2443.4 439.0 242.4 119.3 3244.1 45.3 
3 618.9 944.4 1563.3 760.9 0.0 760.9 2324.1 437.3 242.4 119.3 3123.1 43.8 
4 454.6 944.4 1399.0 743.6 0.0 743.6 2142.6 433.3 242.4 119.3 2937.6 40.3 
5 454.6 944.4 1399.0 743.6 0.0 743.6 2142.6 427.7 242.4 119.3 2932.0 35.5 
6 454.6 944.4 1399.0 743.6 0.0 743.6 2142.6 423.5 242.4 119.3 2927.8 31.9 
# denotes multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
 
 76
Table A1.31:Cournot equilibrium (E=-2/3) 
t qth1 # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1055.0 0.0 1055.0 2672.4 437.1 242.4 119.3 3471.3 43.7
2 673.1 944.4 1617.5 844.9 0.0 844.9 2462.4 434.8 242.4 119.3 3258.8 41.6
3 673.1 944.4 1617.5 743.6 0.0 743.6 2361.1 433.2 242.4 119.3 3156.0 40.3
4 477.5 944.4 1421.8 743.6 0.0 743.6 2165.4 430.4 242.4 119.3 2957.5 37.8
5 454.6 944.4 1399.0 743.6 0.0 743.6 2142.6 426.4 242.4 119.3 2930.7 34.4
6 454.6 944.4 1399.0 743.6 0.0 743.6 2142.6 423.3 242.4 119.3 2927.5 31.7
# denotes multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
 
Table A1.32: Cournot equilibrium (E=-1.0) 
t qth1 # qth2 QRth qh1 # qh2 QRh QR Qthfringe qMR qhPS Qtot Price 
1 673.1 944.4 1617.5 1055.0 0.0 1055.0 2672.4 432.3 242.4 119.3 3466.4 39.5 
2 673.1 944.4 1617.5 844.9 0.0 844.9 2462.4 430.7 242.4 119.3 3254.8 38.1 
3 673.1 944.4 1617.5 743.6 0.0 743.6 2361.1 429.7 242.4 119.3 3152.4 37.2 
4 607.8 944.4 1552.2 743.6 0.0 743.6 2295.8 426.8 242.4 119.3 3084.3 34.8 
5 454.6 944.4 1399.0 743.6 0.0 743.6 2142.6 425.2 242.4 119.3 2929.4 33.3 
6 454.6 944.4 1399.0 743.6 0.0 743.6 2142.6 423.0 242.4 119.3 2927.3 31.5 
# denotes multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 simulations. 
 
Table A1.33: Lerner Indices 
    E=-0.1         E=-1/3  E=0.5  E= -2/3       E=-1.0 
t Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 
1 78% 51% 55% 32% 46% 25% 38% 21% 28% 16% 
2 76% 56% 51% 34% 43% 27% 35% 22% 26% 16% 
3 74% 57% 49% 35% 41% 28% 34% 23% 25% 16% 
4 81% 70% 51% 40% 38% 30% 31% 24% 25% 18% 
5 84% 75% 59% 47% 43% 34% 34% 27% 23% 18% 
6 83% 72% 59% 49% 48% 38% 37% 29% 25% 19% 
 
12 Appendix 2: A simple 1-year Cournot Model for
Chile's Electricity Industry
The model that was used to analyze the exercise of market power in Chile's electricity industry
assumed that the hydro producer was able to allocate its hydro production over a 1 month
planning horizon. In addition, in that model no value was given to the water left in the
reservoir at the end of the month. Accordingly, even though Firm 1, the hydro producer, was
"allowed" by the model to use only a fraction of the water available, incentives pushed more
in the direction of using it all.
In real life, however, producers usually maximize over a longer time horizon, and thus it
is reasonable to expect them to store a fraction of their hydro °ows available in a particular
month in order to use them in a later period. An interesting question is whether the hydro
scheduling pattern that resulted in the 1-month period model would also be observed when
a longer planning horizon is assumed. If so, generators would exploit di®erences in demand
elasticity across months by shifting water from low demand elasticity months to high demand
elasticity months. According to the data reported in Table 15, this means that water should
be stored in October, November and December and released in April, March, January and the
winter months.90 In the paper I report evidence based on MVW analysis suggesting that Firm
1's incentive to exercise market power by shifting hydro production from one month to another
depends on how large are the inter-month di®erences in demand elasticity/ The smaller the
°uctuations, the closer is the hydro scheduling strategy to the traditional competitive supply-
demand or value-maximizing optimization analysis' conclusions (i.e. water is stored when it
is relatively abundant and released when it is relatively scarce).
The MVW analysis is helpful in that one can draw conclusions regarding how hydro °ows
would be allocated across months, but it does not provide information regarding the size of
the °ows that are stored and later released. In addition, it is not possible to compare the
market equilibrium when market power is and is not exercised. In order to address these
issues, a very simple 1-year model was estimated. This model will still su®er the omission
of re-allocation across years but will probably shed lights of the re-allocations that happen
within a year.
Given that the estimation of this model was computationally intensive, I had to use many
simplifying assumptions. In addition, information on many variables was required but not
available; as a consequence, additional assumptions were required.
12.1 The Model
The model is basically the same as the 1-month model. I assumed that there are only two
periods per month (rather than 6): a high demand period and a low demand period (t=1
and t=2 respectively). Each of them lasts for 360/372 hours. Notice that by reducing the
number of periods to only two, I am implicitly reducing the demand variability. Given that
Firm 1 is allowed to store hydro °ows one month and release them in a later period, a state
variable, namely the reservoir level, is introduced. Water in°ows are assumed to get to the
90Market demand was parameterized as before, and thus it was assumed that price elasticity was -1/3 at
the peak anchor point. Residual demand is not constant throughout the year because must run production
and the fringe's production °uctuates over the di®erent months.
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reservoir at the beginning of each month.
Each period, Cournot producers face a residual demand given by:
DR(Pt) = D(Pt) ¡ Sf (Pt) ¡ qMRt ¡ qPSht
where D(P ) is expected market demand, DR(P ) is expected residual market demand,
Sf (P ) is the Fringe's (thermal) supply function (adjusted by transmission losses), qMR is
must-run units' generation and qP Sh is the Fringe's hydro production from reservoirs dis-
tributed across periods according to a Peak shaving strategy.
Firm 2's optimization problem remains basically the same as in the 1-year model. Firm 1's
optimization problem is modi¯ed to take account of the reservoir level, and the corresponding
minimum and maximum capacity constraints.
Firm 1's Optimization problem
max
X
t
fPt(qt)(q1ht + q1T ht) ¡ CT1(q1T ht)g subject to (27)
q1T hMIN · q1T ht · q1T hM AX 8t (thermal production min/max constraints) (28)
q1hMIN · q1ht · q1hMAX t 8t (hydro production min/max constraints) (29)
Sm = Sm¡1 + Fm ¡ q1hydrom8m (Reservoir's level evolution) (30)
SMIN · Sm · SMAX 8m (Reservoir's min/max capacity constraint) (31)
S0 = SIN I (Reservoir's initial level) (32)
S12 = SEN D (Reservoir's level at the end of the year) (33)
where:
m = month index; m = 1,2,..12. m=1 for the ¯rst month of the hydrological year assumed.
t = index for each period of 360/372 hours. Since I assumed that there are only two
periods per month, t = 1,2, 24. The periods are set in chronological order (t=1 for the high
period, month 1; t=2 for the low period, month 1; t=3 for the high period, month 2, and so
on).
Pt(qt) = is the inverse function of the expected residual demand in period t
Qt = is total production by ¯rm 1 and 2 in period t, (Qt = q1t + q2t),
qit = qiTht + qiht is total production by Firm i in period t,
qiTht = total energy produced by Firm i out of thermal plants, period t
q1ht= total energy produced by Firm 1 out of hydro-storage plants, period t
CTi(qiT ht) = Total Cost function, thermal plants, ¯rm i
qiThM IN = Minimum thermal production, Firm i, period t
q1T hMAX = Maximum thermal production, Firm i, period t
q1hMIN = Minimum hydro production, Firm 1, period t
q1hMAX = Maximum hydro production, Firm 1, period t
q1htot = available hydro production for the whole period
Sm= reservoir level at the end of month m, measured in terms of energy.
SIN I= initial reservoir level.
SEN D= end of year reservoir level.
Fm = water in°ow expected to get to the reservoir at the beginning of month m. Measured
in terms of energy.
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q1hydro:m= total energy produced by Firm 1 out of hydro storage plants, month m.
q1hydro:m = q1h(2m¡1) + q1h(2m) :91
The objective function is basically the same as in the 1-month model except for the
residual demand, which is in terms of expectation. Constraints (28) and (29) are the same as
in the 1-month model and thus need no further explanation. Constraint (30) states that the
hydro energy available in the reservoir at the end of each month is equal to the hydro energy
available at the end of the previous month plus the water in°ows (in terms of hydro energy)
received at the beginning of the month and less the hydro energy that was produced during
the month. Constraint (31) states the minimum and maximum bound for the reservoir level.
Finally constraints (32) and (33) are initial and end conditions.92
This version of the model takes into the account the incentives Firm 1 has to re-allocate
water from one month to another (but always within a year). This is a good assumption for
all the Chilean reservoirs except for El Laja (the biggest one) that is so big that its water can
be allocated from one year to another. For the moment it is not possible to estimate a model
with such a long planning horizon because the information requirements cannot be ful¯lled.
This model's treatment of uncertainty is certainly simplistic and incomplete. Only ex-
pected values of water in°ows and demand per period are considered. Variability is not taken
into account because there was no information available. This omission is important, espe-
cially with respect to hydro in°ows, as hydro producers are likely to manage their reservoirs
taking into account the probability of the hydrological year being normal, dry or rainy. Under
the current regulation, generators are required to ensure the power supply even under the
driest conditions. As a consequence it is reasonable to expect them to manage the reservoirs
less aggressively. The exercise of market power is not likely to be the unique goal producers
pursue as this model implicitly assumes.
I assumed that the discount rate was equal to zero.
12.2 Model Estimation
The model was estimated under two di®erent market assumptions: i) the market is perfectly
competitive and ii) producers are able to exercise market power.
Market demand was assumed to be linear. Each month's slope was calculated such that
the elasticity at the peak demand level is -1/3. Anchor quantity to parameterize demand
was set to the average load (augmented by spinning reserves) of the highest/lowest 360/372
hours. Anchor price was given by each month's nodal price. Table A2.1 reports the data
used to parameterize the market demand and to estimate the residual demand.
Capacity and marginal cost functions are the same as in the 1-month model.
Hydro in°ows are given by the average hydro generation per month reported by the
CNE for "normal" hydrological year (See Table A2.2). In this sense, water in°ows can
be interpreted as "expected °ows". These in°ows were used to allocate hydro production
according to a peak shaving strategy, when needed. In the model where Firms 1 and 2 are
supposed to be able to exercise market power, I allocated the Fringe's hydro production
according to this approach. In this case, I assumed that its water in°ows were not large
enough to store a portion of them given the min and max production constraints. As a
91q1hydrom¡1 = q1h(t=1) + q1h(t=2); q1hydrom¡2 = q1h(t¡3) + q1h(t¡4) , and so on.
92The model will be estimated under two versions: with and without constraint (2.21).
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consequence, its hydro production per period was calculated by allocating hydro resources
over a 1-month time period. When perfect competition is assumed, water in°ows of the entire
system are allocated according to the peak shaving strategy.
As expected, results of the model turned out to be sensitive to the starting month of the
one-year period (i.e. hydro scheduling for the year Jan - Dec was slightly di®erent than for
April - March, and so on). The longer the planning horizon, the less important the starting
point is. Unfortunately, my data set is too short to further increase the time horizon. In
addition I do not have information that could be used to simulate water in°ows for a longer
period. In an attempt to overcome this problem, I estimated the model and the competitive
equilibrium for the 12 possible starting points. I will report results for each estimation and
will look for general trends.
I assumed that minimum and maximum capacity of the reservoirs were not restrictive,
as I did not have information for many of them. This assumption should not introduce too
many distortions as in the past years the reservoir level reached its maximum or minimum
capacity only a few times, and most of them took place in very rainy or dry years, and thus
in periods in which in°ows were di®erent from the ones used to estimate this model.93
The reservoir level at the end of the year may be important too, being this another
consequence of the short time period used. In order to analyze how important this constraint
is, I estimated two versions of the model:
- Reservoir level at the end of the year restricted to be equal to the initial level; in this
way, Firm 1 is constrained to use all the water available in the year ("bounded estimation").
- Reservoir level at the end of the year restricted to be within min/max bound limits
(Constraint (33) is not included). Firm 1 is implicitly allowed to use only a fraction of the
water available for the whole year ("unbounded estimation")
It is worth to mention that even though results from these two versions of the model di®er,
the di®erences are rather small. In particular, any change in the amount of hydro production
is usually compensated at least in part by a change in Firm 2's thermal production.
12.3 Results
I do not intend to exhaustively analyze the results of this model's simulation, as many of
the results are similar, in qualitative terms, to what was found in the 1-month model and
additional insights are beyond this paper's reach. I will focus on the question that motivated
the estimation of this model: Would Firm 1 store water in low price-elasticity of demand
months and release it in high price-elasticity of demand months as it could be extrapolated
from the 1-month model? The analysis will be made in comparative terms. In particular, I
will compare each month's rate of use of water in°ows that results in the Cournot and in the
competitive model. Results are reported in Tables A2.3, A2.4, A2.5 and A2.6
The assumption for the reservoir level at the end of the year turned out not to be impor-
tant, as results from the "bounded" and "unbounded" almost coincide.
The starting month assumption is more important for the competitive equilibrium than
for any of the Cournot models estimated. In the latter, the pattern of hydro scheduling is
almost always the same (but magnitudes di®er), no matter what month was assumed to be
93The problem to this argument is that all the observations are from periods in which the management of
hydro resources is supposed to have been competitive.
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the ¯rst. In particular, water is stored in June and July (winter months) and October and
November. Water from June and July is completely shifted to August and September, while
water stored in October and November is allocated to the ¯rst half of the year. In the case of
the competitive equilibrium, when the model was estimated assuming that the initial month
was any of the ¯rst 5 months, all the water available was exhausted in every 1-month period.
Results start to change as June and the months in the second half of the year are assumed
to be the "initial month", as there is enough water to be stored and used in a later period94.
In a perfectly competitive industry, water would be stored in the second half of the year, the
rainy and melting season, and released in the ¯rst half of the next year. This allocation is in
line with the availability of hydro production relative to demand as power is "saved" in the
periods when it is relatively abundant and it is released when it is relatively scarce.
As I mentioned, a Cournot producer would store power in June, July, October and Novem-
ber. According to these results, it could not be argued that water is allocated from low
elasticity months to high elasticity months. Indeed, as Table A2.6 reports, the correlation
coe±cient between the average price elasticity of demand and the rate of use of available
hydro °ows is positive, as expected, but relatively small (0.37). Firm 1's hydro scheduling
strategy is closer to the conclusions of the traditional competitive supply-demand analysis,
where water is stored in those periods in which it is relatively abundant and released when it is
relatively scarce. This conclusion is supported by the correlation coe±cient between the rate
of use of available hydro °ows and the in°ows/demand monthly ratio (-0.89). See Charts
A2.1 and A2.2 for a graphic support of the relative importance of each of the alternative
explanations for the hydro scheduling strategy.
In order to understand why Firm 1 does not inter-month di®erences in demand elasticity,
two alternative hypotheses are formally analyzed.
1. Intra-month di®erences in demand elasticity are big enough and water can be allocated
within a month in order to exercise market power. In order to analyze this hypothesis, I
estimated the model assuming no intra-month di®erences in demand elasticity and keeping
constant inter-month di®erences. A priori, this explanation does not sound plausible as I
assumed that there are only two periods in each month and therefore, demand variability
is considerably reduced. If this hypothesis is true, then we should observe that given that
producers cannot exploit intra-month demand variability, greater inter-month reallocation
should be observed. As it is reported in Table A2.6, column (2), the resulting correlation
coe±cient between the use rate of available in°ows and price-elasticity of demand is still
positive, but considerably smaller. At the same time, the correlation with the in°ows/demand
ratio is still high and thus the relationship strong. Accordingly, intra-month variability seems
not to be a good explanation.
2. Inter-month di®erences in demand elasticity are relatively small. As a result, the
incentive to exploit them is also small. In order to test for this hypothesis, I estimated the
model assuming that price elasticity of market demand was not -1/3 at the peak anchor point,
as I did in the previous exercise, but could take di®erent values (E=-0.1, -1/3, -1/2, -2/3,
-1.0) which were randomly allocated to each month. Consequently, inter-month variability of
price elasticity of demand was 7 times higher. Results are fully supportive of this hypothesis.
Indeed, the correlation coe±cient is very high (0.95) and it is almost una®ected when no
intra-month variability is assumed (column (4)).
94In line with this result is the greater standard deviation that resulted in the competitive model.
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Observe that the larger are inter-month di®erences in price elasticity, the more incentives
Firm 1 has to allocate its hydro resources in order to exercise market power and the less
relevant is the traditional competitive supply-demand analysis in order to understand the
hydro scheduling strategy (See Figures A2.3 and A2.4). Preliminary evidence from a 1-year
model is in line with the MVW analysis: producers' incentive to exercise market power by
shifting water from one month to another depends on how large inter-month di®erences in
price elasticity are. The smaller the di®erence, the closer is the hydro scheduling strategy
to the traditional supply-demand analysis' conclusions (i.e. more water to periods in which
water is relatively scarce).
I would like to conclude this analysis by emphasizing that this model is just an attempt to
address the issue of hydro scheduling over a longer planning horizon when ¯rms have market
power. It is clear that an additional modeling e®ort is needed in order to have more de¯nitive
answers. In particular, it is necessary to improve the treatment of uncertainty and to further
increase the planning horizon (in order to reduce the importance of the starting and ¯nal
points).
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